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ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the legality of so-called “secondary 
sanctions” under customary principles of international jurisdiction 
law.  Ordinarily, when the United States imposes economic 
sanctions, it imposes primary sanctions only—to restrict its own 
companies and citizens (or other people who are in the United 
States) from doing business with a rogue regime, terrorist group, 
or other international pariah.  Secondary sanctions, such as 
secondary trade boycotts and foreign company divestment, 
involve additional economic restrictions designed to inhibit non-
U.S. citizens and companies abroad from doing business with a 
target of primary U.S. sanctions.  Secondary sanctions have proven 
highly controversial, in part because of broad claims that they are 
illegally “extraterritorial” in purpose and effect.  This Article 
challenges the conventional view.  It suggests that a wide range of 
secondary sanctions measures are permissible if tailored to 
regulate exclusively on “terrinational” grounds—on the combined 
basis of territorial and nationality jurisdiction.  Secondary 
sanctions may seldom be wise as a matter of policy, but when 
primary sanctions fail, secondary sanctions may be a last 
alternative to the use of military force.  Because the use of 
secondary sanctions has been complicated by lack of clarity about 
their legality, terrinational forms of secondary sanctions should be 
considered as an alternative to other more legally controversial 
forms of secondary sanctions. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States commonly deploys unilateral economic 
sanctions against evil dictatorial regimes, fanatical terrorists, 
nuclear weapons proliferators, and international narcotraffickers.  
But if ordinary sanctions do not work and other countries do 
business as usual with a sanctions target, is it legal under 
customary international law for the United States to broaden its 
sanctions to deter third countries and their citizens and companies 
from doing or continuing business with the sanctions target? 
For example, while the United States prohibits its own citizens 
and companies from engaging in most forms of business dealings 
with the genocidal government of Sudan, China has become 
Sudan’s largest investor and trading partner.1  Would it be legal for 
the United States to stop its companies from doing business with 
Chinese companies that do business in Sudan?  Could the United 
States permissibly order its citizens to divest ownership in any 
foreign companies that do business in Sudan?  Or—as many 
commentators suggest—are such U.S. efforts to disrupt trade and 
investment between foreign countries improper acts of 
“extraterritorial jurisdiction” in violation of customary 
international law? 
These kinds of measures include all forms of “secondary 
sanctions”—economic restrictions designed to deter third-country 
actors from supporting a primary target of unilateral sanctions.  
They respond to an obvious weakness of conventional unilateral 
sanctions that preclude U.S. companies from doing business with a 
target regime while implicitly inviting foreign companies to take 
their place.  Secondary sanctions tighten the noose of conventional 
unilateral sanctions by inhibiting non-U.S. citizens and companies 
from transacting with or supporting a target regime. 
Secondary sanctions have proved cringingly controversial and 
often politically counterproductive.  By impeding the business 
interests of major U.S. trading partners that have not joined a U.S. 
sanctions effort, secondary sanctions can antagonize major trading 
partners of the United States and undermine U.S. efforts to rally 
consensus for more effective multilateral sanctions.  Yet, the 
ultimate goal of complete isolation of a target regime by means of 
 
1 See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (describing how the Chinese-
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comprehensive multilateral sanctions is increasingly difficult to 
achieve, often because of resistance from Russia and China in the 
United Nations Security Council.2 
When unilateral sanctions prove ineffective and multilateral 
sanctions unachievable, secondary sanctions remain a tempting 
policy alternative for U.S. policymakers.  Perhaps this attraction 
explains the Janus-like approach of U.S. policy toward secondary 
sanctions.  On the one hand, the United States has long condemned 
secondary boycott laws, such as the Arab League’s secondary 
boycott of Israel, which would require as a condition of sale of oil 
to U.S. companies that they agree not to do business with Israel.  
On the other hand, the United States itself periodically enacts 
secondary sanctions measures, such as the Helms-Burton Act and 
the Iran Sanctions Act to deter foreigners from doing business with 
Cuba and Iran.  More recently, as frustration grows with the 
ineffectiveness of existing sanctions measures to prompt human 
rights improvements in places such as Sudan and Myanmar, the 
United States has imposed modest secondary sanctions measures 
to discourage foreign companies from doing business there.3 
The academic commentary has been less than kind to 
secondary sanctions.  Most commentators lambast specific 
measures such as the Arab League boycott or the Helms-Burton 
Act.  Many commentators assume that secondary sanctions are 
illegally “extraterritorial,” exceeding the proper bounds of U.S. 
jurisdictional authority under customary international law.4 
The commentary to date has yet to undertake a comprehensive 
assessment of the international jurisdictional validity of secondary 
sanctions measures.  This Article starts down that path, advancing 
two principal points.  First, it contends that secondary sanctions 
cannot be categorically dismissed as improperly “extraterritorial.”  
Secondary sanctions surely aim to affect foreign actors’ conduct, 
but this quality makes them no more impermissibly 
“extraterritorial” than conventional primary sanctions that are not 
subject to legitimate jurisdictional question.  Whether the United 
States is barring its companies from doing business with Sudan 
 
2 See infra notes 40–49 and accompanying text (describing the obstruction of 
efforts to impose such sanctions due to unilateral veto power at the Security 
Council). 
3 See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (describing sanctions statutes). 
4 See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text (surveying commentators’ 
views). 
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(primary sanctions) or barring its companies from doing business 
with Chinese companies that do business in Sudan (secondary 
sanctions), it seeks “extraterritorially” to alter human rights 
conduct abroad. 
This leads to the second and major point of this Article.  If 
secondary sanctions are not categorically invalidated merely by 
their purpose to change extraterritorial conduct, then it may be that 
at least some forms of secondary sanctions measures can be 
justified if grounded in and consistent with traditional principles of 
prescriptive jurisdiction.  Without attempting a taxonomy of all 
kinds of secondary sanctions measures that could be justified 
under international customary jurisdictional principles, this Article 
contends that secondary sanctions should be viewed as 
presumptively permissible and reasonable if based exclusively on a 
combination of territoriality and nationality jurisdiction (as distinct 
from jurisdiction based on only one of these grounds or any other 
grounds such as protective, effects, or universal jurisdiction).  For 
simplicity of reference, I will coin the term “terrinational 
sanctions” to refer to these combined jurisdictional grounds.5 
Terrinational secondary sanctions regulate only the conduct 
within the prescribing nation-state’s territory of its own nationals 
(individual or corporate).  Terrinational sanctions can be primary 
(if directed against a country or entity that is the primary target of 
sanctions) or secondary (if directed against a person or entity from 
a third country that does business with the primary sanctions 
target).  One example of a terrinational secondary sanctions 
measure would be a U.S. law prohibiting any U.S. national while in 
the United States from doing business with any Chinese company 
that has business operations in Sudan.  A non-terrinational 
secondary sanctions law would lack either or both of these 
territorial and nationality links—for example, a U.S. law 
prohibiting Chinese companies from doing business with Sudan or 
 
5 Territorial jurisdiction is sometimes defined to include not only conduct 
within a nation-state’s territory but also extraterritorial acts that cause or are 
intended to cause a substantial effect within a nation’s territory.  See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
402(1), (1987) (enumerating the bases upon which a state has territorial 
jurisdiction).  This Article limits use of the term “territorial” jurisdiction to refer to 
the core concept of the regulation of conduct that takes place within a nation-
state’s territory and not acts that take place abroad with substantial effects in a 
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even a U.S. law prohibiting U.S. citizens in China from working for 
Chinese companies that do business in Sudan. 
Why should a terrinational limitation legally justify a 
secondary sanctions measure?  Because territoriality and 
nationality are the two strongest grounds that legitimate a nation-
state’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction.  When these two 
grounds exist simultaneously as the basis for regulation, a nation-
state’s exercise of jurisdiction should be viewed as per se 
reasonable.  Put differently, it is reasonable for the United States—
rather than other countries—to make rules of conduct for its own 
citizens in its own territory.  It would be unreasonable for a foreign 
state to prescribe rules of conduct for U.S. nationals within U.S. 
territory (at least in the absence of conduct by U.S. nationals in U.S. 
territory that puts the United States in violation of a treaty or that 
otherwise violates a substantive rule of international law). 
What is the benefit of recognizing the jurisdictional validity of 
terrinational secondary sanctions?  The debate about secondary 
sanctions is clouded by a misconception that secondary sanctions 
are generally illegal or that particular sanctions measures exceed 
permissible limits solely because of their purpose or effect to alter 
conduct occurring beyond the sanctioning state’s borders.6  The 
United States itself is prone to exaggerated claims that secondary 
sanctions measures can be justified by the protective or effects 
jurisdictional principles, even when these measures aim to redress 
non-military human rights abuses or other anti-democratic conduct 
that occurs in distant lands and that has no real prospect of 
jeopardizing the safety of or causing any substantial effect in the 
United States.  Although terrinational sanctions apply to a smaller 
range of actors than conventional sanctions that are not restricted 
to the in-country conduct of a country’s own nationals, 
terrinational secondary sanctions still extend the effect of primary 
sanctions and can do so without engendering crippling debate and 
countermeasures contesting their legal validity. 
Terrinational limits on secondary sanctions sensibly reconcile 
competing interests of the United States to control what its own 
citizens do in its own territory while not exposing foreign actors to 
liability for failure to comply with U.S. law.  Allowing the use of 
terrinational secondary sanctions means that the United States may 
disassociate itself more fully from lending the benefits of the U.S. 
 
6 See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text (surveying commentators’ 
views regarding extraterritorial illegality of secondary sanctions). 
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economy in support of abhorrent conduct.  The United States is not 
forced for lack of prescriptive jurisdiction to allow its citizens and 
companies in U.S. territory to do business with parties that 
support—even indirectly—odious regimes, groups, or individuals 
that are the subject of primary U.S. sanctions.  On the other hand, 
the terrinational limits of secondary sanctions ensure that only U.S. 
nationals are subject to penalty for failure to comply with a 
terrinational secondary sanctions measure. 
Section 2 of this Article briefly surveys the legal landscape for 
today’s major sanctions regimes.  It discusses unilateral sanctions 
imposed by the United States as well as multilateral sanctions 
imposed by the United Nations Security Council.  It suggests that 
secondary sanctions may occasionally prove necessary when 
unilateral primary sanctions have failed and when consensus on 
multilateral sanctions is unlikely.  Section 3 defines the term 
“secondary sanctions” and discusses several controversially 
prominent secondary sanctions measures, including the Arab 
League boycott, the Helms-Burton law, and the Iran Sanctions Act.  
Section 4—the core of this Article—turns to evaluating the 
jurisdictional validity of secondary sanctions.  It dispels the 
argument that secondary sanctions are jurisdictionally 
impermissible merely because of their intent to affect conduct 
abroad.  It then outlines the case for the fashioning of 
terrinationally limited secondary sanctions in cases where 
secondary sanctions may be warranted. 
Before turning to these issues, it is important to note what this 
Article does not address.  First, it does not address potential 
objections under trade law to secondary sanctions.  Several 
commentators have addressed the validity of sanctions measures 
generally under international trade laws, with emphasis on 
recognized exceptions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”) for measures that are necessary to protect morals, 
public health, and national security.  Although this Article does not 
add to the substantial literature on this topic,7 this Article is 
 
7 See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights—Past, 
Present, and Future, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 797, 809–30 (2003) (discussing compatibility 
of human rights sanctions with trade law); Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights 
Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 133, 
149–89 (2002) [hereinafter Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions] (same); see also 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 41–48, 65–69 (2001) [hereinafter Cleveland, Norm Internalization] 
(discussing efforts to rely of unilateral economic sanctions to enforce international 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/5
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significant to the trade law debate because, as commentators have 
realized, the interpretation of trade law may depend critically on 
assumptions about the scope of what measures are allowed under 
the customary law of international jurisdiction.8 
Nor does this Article focus on other forms of secondary 
sanctions that have provoked much controversy.  For example, 
some U.S. sanctions laws extend their reach to foreign-
incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporations, and some 
U.S. export laws forbid foreign companies from re-exporting goods 
originating from the United States to certain regimes.9  Although 
these measures pose interesting jurisdictional questions, their 
effectiveness is compromised by the discord they engender among 
U.S. trading partners that insist on their authority to govern the 
conduct of companies that are incorporated under their own laws.  
The point of this Article’s focus on terrinational secondary 
sanctions is to articulate a class of secondary sanctions that can 
better withstand legal jurisdictional challenge, thus allowing the 
debate about whether to deploy secondary sanctions to focus on 
their policy soundness rather than their legal validity.  As 
politically contentious as secondary sanctions may often prove to 
be, they are surely valuable to retain as an alternative in the worst 
cases to the devastation of using military force. 
2.  MULTILATERAL AND UNILATERAL SANCTIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
Since Pericles led Athens, political states have deployed 
economic sanctions against other states as weapons of international 
diplomacy.10  Modern economic sanctions span a broad range of 
measures such as arms embargoes, general trade embargoes, asset 
freezes, and travel restrictions, all designed to punish, influence, or 
 
norms); Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 689, 
691 (1988) (considering practical applications of the morals exception in GATT 
and other WTO agreements). 
8 See Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 353, 365–66 (2002) (suggesting that GATT art. XX 
be read in terms of customary international law governing the exercise of 
legislative jurisdiction, rather than substantive law); Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory 
Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 631, 633–34 (2007) (examining the 
allocation of regulatory authority in recent WTO cases). 
9 See infra notes 62, 68–69 and accompanying text. 
10 See Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the 
Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1168 n.18 (1987) (describing the 
economic sanction Pericles imposed on Megara in 432 BC). 
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otherwise isolate and contain adversary nations as well as specific 
individuals and non-state entities engaged in harmful or 
threatening activity.11 
The United States today has unilateral sanctions programs 
relating to many countries and regions, including the Balkans, 
Belarus, Cuba, the Congo, Iran, Iraq, Cote d’Ivoire, Myanmar, 
North Korea, the Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe.12  The broadest of 
its programs involve general embargos on trade and financial 
transactions with longstanding hostile regimes such as Cuba, 
North Korea, Iran, and Syria.13  Other sanctions measures focus 
more narrowly on penalizing the leadership and close associates of 
enemy regimes, as well as hundreds of designated terrorist, drug 
trafficking, and weapons-proliferating persons and entities.14 
 
11 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: 
HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 3 (3d ed. 2007) (1985) (defining “economic 
sanctions” to mean “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of 
withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations”); Carter, supra note 10, at 
1166 (defining “economic sanctions” to mean “coercive economic measures taken 
against one or more countries to attempt to force a change in policies, or at least to 
demonstrate the sanctioning country’s opinion of another’s policies,” and 
suggesting that U.S. economic sanctions measures “can roughly be grouped into 
five categories, as limits on: (1) U.S. government programs, such as foreign 
assistance and landing rights; (2) exports from the United States; (3) imports; (4) 
private financial transactions; and (5) international financial institutions”). 
12 The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States 
Department of Treasury administers most of the U.S. international economic 
sanctions programs; its website lists the countries, regions, and other specially 
designated persons subject to sanctions.  See U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2009) (describing the mission of the OFAC).  United States 
sanctions laws are also administered in part by the Commerce Department’s 
Bureau of Industry and Security and also by the State Department’s Directorate of 
Defense Trade Controls.  See generally John R. Liebman & Kevin J. Lombardo, A 
Guide to Export Controls for the Non-Specialist, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 497 
(2006) (providing an overview of U.S. export control laws). 
13 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control Country 
Sanctions Program, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac 
/programs/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (providing state by state overview of 
current OFAC sanctions). 
14 OFAC administers sanctions against three principal classes of non-state 
entities: (1) terrorists, (2) narcotics traffickers, and (3) proliferators of weapons of 
mass destruction.  See id; see also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, Nonproliferation—What You Need to Know About Treasury 
Restrictions (Jan. 19, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices 
/enforcementm/ofac/programs/wmd/wmd.pdf (listing persons and entities 
subject to weapons proliferation sanctions); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Office of 
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Recent years have marked a significant expansion in U.S. 
unilateral sanctions measures: 
The Balkans.  In June 2001, President Bush signed an executive 
order requiring U.S. persons to block the assets within their 
possession or control of designated persons involved with 
destabilizing the peace process in the Balkans.15 
Terrorists.  In late September 2001, the President blocked the 
assets of all foreign persons “determined . . . to have committed, or 
to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism” 
threatening U.S. interests and also the assets of any persons 
assisting designated terrorists or “otherwise associated” with 
them.16  Hundreds of persons and entities have since been placed 
on the terrorism blacklist subject to blocking sanctions.17 
Zimbabwe.  In March 2003, and again in 2005 and 2008, the 
President ordered the blocking of assets and barred U.S. persons 
from transacting with designated persons who are “undermining 
democratic institutions and processes” in Zimbabwe.18 
 
(providing a 416-page list of “Specially Designated Nationals” subject to U.S. anti-
terrorism sanctions); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Drug Traffickers (Feb. 17, 2009), 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/narco/drugs.pdf 
(listing several hundred individuals and entities subject to blocking of assets and 
property in accordance with the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 1901–08, and Executive Order 12978). 
15 Exec. Order No. 13,219, 66 Fed. Reg. 3477 (June 26, 2001). See also Exec. 
Order No. 13,304, 68 Fed. Reg. 32,315 (May 28, 2003) (revising Balkans sanctions); 
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Balkans—What You Need 
to Know About U.S. Sanctions (May 29, 2003), http://www.treas.gov/offices 
/enforcement/ofac/programs/balkans/balkans.pdf (summarizing U.S. efforts to 
block property of persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the 
Western Balkans). 
16 Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001), as amended by 
Exec. Order No. 13,268, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,751 (July 2, 2002) and Exec. Order No. 
13,372, 70 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Feb. 16, 2005); see also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, Terrorism—What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions 
(Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs 
/terror/ terror.pdf. 
17 See Terrorism—What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions, supra note 16 
(listing names and aliases more than 100 pages long). 
18 See Exec. Order No. 13,391, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,201 (Nov. 22, 2005) 
(superseding prior executive order of March 6, 2003) (establishing sanctions 
including blocking of assets and prohibition of financial transactions); 31 C.F.R. § 
541 (2008) (Zimbabwe sanctions regulations); Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
U.S. Department of Treasury, Zimbabwe—What You Need to Know About U.S. 
Sanctions (Nov. 23, 2005), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac 
/programs/zimbabwe/zimb.pdf (explaining the Executive Order imposing 
Zimbabwe sanctions).  See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Former Liberian Regime of Charles Taylor.  In July 2004, the 
President ordered U.S. persons to block the assets of designated 
persons associated with the former regime of Charles Taylor in 
Liberia.19 
Cote d’Ivoire.  In February 2006, the President barred U.S. 
persons from engaging in most forms of financial transactions with 
designated persons threatening the peace in Cote d’Ivoire (the 
Ivory Coast).20 
Belarus.  In June 2006, the President ordered U.S. persons to 
block the assets of designated persons “undermin[ing] Belarus’ 
democratic processes or institutions,” including persons 
undermining democracy through human rights abuses and 
corruption.21 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  In October 2006, the President 
ordered U.S. persons to block the assets of designated persons 
contributing to instability and violence in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, including military leaders impeding the disarmament 
 
Faces Wider Sanctions Under Bush Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/world/africa/29diplo.html?hp 
 (noting plans to call for international arms embargo and to broaden U.S. 
unilateral sanctions to “take aim at the entire government of President Robert 
Mugabe,” but noting that Security Council not likely to support sanctions because 
of opposition from Russia, China, and South Africa); Steven Lee Myers, U.S. 
Strengthens Zimbabwe Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/world/africa/26prexy.html  (describing 
expansion of U.S. sanctions to include additional mining and banking companies 
because they provide the most foreign currency to Zimbabwe). 
19 See Exec. Order No. 13,348, 69 Fed. Reg. 44,885 (July 22, 2004) (establishing 
sanctions against the former Liberian regime); see also 31 C.F.R. § 593 (2008) 
(Former Liberian regime of Charles Taylor sanctions regulations); Office of 
Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, Former Liberian Regime of 
Charles Taylor—What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions (May 23, 2007), 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/liberia/liberia.pdf 
(explaining the Executive Order on Liberian sanctions). 
20 See Exec. Order No. 13,396, 71 Fed. Reg. 7389 (Feb. 7, 2006) (establishing 
sanctions against certain participants in conflict in Cote d’Ivorie); Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, Cote d’Ivoire—What You Need to 
Know About U.S. Sanctions (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.treas.gov/offices 
/enforcement/ofac/programs/coted/coted.pdf (explaining the Executive Order 
imposing Cote d’Ivorie sanctions). 
21 See Exec. Order No. 13,405, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,485 (June 16, 2006) (establishing 
sanctions against certain citizens of Belarus); see also Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, Belarus—What You Need to Know About U.S. 
Sanctions (June 19, 2006), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac 
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and resettlement of combatants and using child soldiers in armed 
conflicts.22 
President Woodrow Wilson famously endorsed the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions and the advantage of their use 
as an alternative to war: 
A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of 
surrender.  Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly 
remedy and there will be no need for force.  It is a terrible 
remedy.  It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, 
but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my 
judgment, no modern nation could resist.23 
Yet many decades of experience have failed to resolve doubts 
about the efficacy of sanctions to alter bad behavior.24  Sometimes 
sanctions seem to “work” in whole or in part—perhaps by 
inducing change in a rogue regime’s policies or, indirectly, by 
inhibiting the wealth and ability of a rogue regime to engage in 
aggressive or repressive activity.25  Yet too often sanctions glance 
 
22 See Exec. Order No. 13,413, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,105 (Oct. 27, 2006) (establishing 
sanctions against rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo); Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, Democratic Republic of the Congo—
What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.treas.gov 
/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/drc/drcongo.pdf (explaining the 
Executive Order imposing Congo sanctions). 
23 Carter, supra note 10, at 1169 n.20 (quoting WILSON’S IDEALS 108 (S. Padover 
ed., 1942)). 
24 Sanctions, of course, may be but one instrument used to alter foreign state 
behavior.  See Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law 
Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1401–08 (1999) (discussing the role of coercive 
sanctions in combination with non-coercive measures to encourage 
“internalization” of values by norm-violating foreign regimes).  Although this 
Article focuses on the potential utility and legality of secondary sanctions 
measures, sanctions may also serve normative purposes other than changing or 
containing a specific regime or individual’s bad behavior.  See Cleveland, Norm 
Internalization, supra note 7, at 6 (“[E]conomic sanctions have an importance 
beyond their classical role in seeking to punish and alter a foreign state’s 
behavior—that of assisting in the international definition, promulgation, 
recognition, and domestic internalization of human rights norms.”). 
25 See, e.g., HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 11, at 78–82 (assessing efficacy of 
sanctions on basis of review of 174 sanctions measures from World War I to 2000); 
Cleveland, Norm Internalization, supra note 7, at 5–6 (citing historical examples of 
apparent success of sanctions in Brazil, Burma, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, South 
Africa, and Uganda); Carter, supra note 10, at 1163 (“Despite significant failures, 
however, detailed studies suggest that [U.S. economic] sanctions have been 
successful in some situations,” including “help[ing] to topple Haiti’s Duvalier in 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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off the target regime with little apparent effect; even worse, they 
may provoke sympathy and galvanize internal political support for 
an embattled regime and its leaders.26 
Recent experiences with sanctions against North Korea and 
Iran—the world’s two most feared nuclear rogue regimes—present 
a muddled picture of the success of sanctions in combination with 
positive incentives and intense diplomacy efforts.  North Korea has 
re-engaged in talks concerning its nuclear weapons program, in 
part due to pressure from financial banking sanctions.27  
Meanwhile, Iran denounces the mounting sanctions against it but 
feels their effect, and continues to cooperate in part with 
international nuclear arms inspectors.28 
 
1986, Uganda’s Idi Amin in 1979, Chile’s Allende in 1973, and the Dominican 
Republic’s Trujillo in 1961.”). 
26 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 11, at 8 (“[E]conomic sanctions may unify 
the target country both in support of its government and in search of commercial 
alternatives . . . [and] may prompt powerful or wealthy allies of the target country 
to assume the role of ‘black knight,’ largely offset[ing] whatever deprivation 
results from the sanctions themselves.”). 
27 See, e.g., Helene Cooper, Bush Rebuffs Hard-Liners to Ease North Korean 
Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008 
/06/27/world/asia/27nuke.html (noting easing of U.S. sanctions against North 
Korea in response to recent nuclear-related disclosures and actions); Steven R. 
Weisman, How U.S. Turned North Korean Funds Into a Bargaining Chip, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/world/asia 
/12bank.html (discussing how unfreezing of North Korean funds in a Macao 
bank assisted U.S. efforts to reopen nuclear talks with North Korea); Warren 
Hoge, Security Council Supports Sanctions on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, 
available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/world/asia/15nations.html 
(noting enactment of Security Council sanctions in response to North Korean 
missile test and apparent effect on North Korean regime of U.S. pressure on an 
offshore bank holding North Korean funds); Joel Brinkley, U.S. Squeezes North 
Korea’s Money Flow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/10/politics/10korea.html (“Six months after 
the Bush administration blacklisted a bank in Macao accused of laundering 
money for the North Korean government, senior administration officials say the 
action has proved to be far more effective than anyone had dreamed.”). 
28 See, e.g., Farnaz Fassihi and Chip Cummins, Cat and Mouse: Iranians Scheme 
to Elude Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at A1 (suggesting that combination of 
U.S. and U.N. sanctions “haven’t brought Iran to its knees,” but that “Iranian 
businesses are starting to feel the pain” in terms of an inflationary impact on the 
Iranian economy and “how they finance operations, pay bills and export 
everything from pistachio nuts to Persian carpets”); Zahra Hosseinian & Alistair 
Lyon, Iran Tests Missiles, Heightening Tensions with the West, REUTERS, July 9, 2008, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL0925390620080709 
(noting State Department testimony “that Iran had made only ‘modest’ progress 
in its nuclear program because of U.N. sanctions . . . .”). 
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This broader efficacy debate aside, little doubt remains that 
multilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations are 
preferable to unilateral sanctions by one country alone.29  The 
United Nations Charter authorizes the Security Council to impose 
economic sanctions in the event of a threat to peace and security.30  
When the Security Council imposes sanctions, all member 
countries are bound by its mandate.31 
By contrast, when one country such as the United States 
imposes unilateral sanctions, no other countries are legally bound.  
A target of U.S. unilateral sanctions is free to replace any loss of 
U.S.-related business with new business from third countries that 
have not imposed sanctions.32  Indeed, non-target countries and 
companies may tacitly welcome U.S. unilateral sanctions because 
of the new opportunities that may emerge to do business with the 
targets of U.S. sanctions.33 
 
29 See, e.g., EDWARD C. LUCK, UN SECURITY COUNCIL—PRACTICE AND PROMISE 
67 (2007) (“[I]n most cases the chances of being persuasive with sanctions are 
much higher with multilateral than unilateral ones, since the broader the 
international cooperation the less likely that they will be circumvented or 
undermined by others.”); MEGHAN L. O’SULLIVAN, SHREWD SANCTIONS: STATECRAFT 
AND STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM 300 (2003) (“The cases in this book not only 
confirm the much-heralded conclusion that multilateral sanctions are the most 
effective form of economic pressure, but also suggest that even targeted or limited 
multilateral measures are preferable to comprehensive, unilateral ones.”). 
30 See U.N. Charter art. 39 (Security Council may decide upon “measures . . . 
to maintain or restore international peace and security” in the event it 
“determine[s] the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression.”); id. art. 41 (“The Security Council may decide what measures not 
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, 
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.  
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and 
the severance of diplomatic relations.”).  See generally LUCK, supra note 29, at 58–67 
(surveying history of Security Council sanctions measures). 
31 U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.”). 
32 O’SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 303 (noting that the “initial shock of U.S. 
trade sanctions fades quickly, as countries diversify their trade partners,” 
especially in cases “[w]here the target country sells a fungible commodity in high 
global demand, [for which] the realignment of trade patters can be almost 
seamless”). 
33 See Fassihi & Cummins, supra note 28, at A1 (noting that U.S. sanctions on 
Iran “are providing China and other Asian giants with an opening to win big oil 
projects in Iran”); Jeffrey Gettleman, War in Sudan? Not Where the Oil Wealth Flows, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24 
/world/africa/24sudan.html (noting that “American sanctions have kept many 
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Multilateral sanctions are estimated to be effective at least one-
third of the time.34  As a recent United Nations report notes, “[i]f 
effectiveness is defined as the creation of impacts that lead to at 
least partial compliance [with the conditions for lifting of 
sanctions], Security Council sanctions have achieved results in at 
least one-third to one-half of all cases, depending on how 
generously one defines partial compliance.”35  By contrast, 
unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States are estimated to 
work less than twenty percent of the time in recent years.36  “The 
most obvious and important explanation for the decline in the 
effectiveness of U.S. sanctions is the relative decline of the U.S. 
position in the world economy.”37 
Although unilateral sanctions are easily evaded, the Security 
Council has great difficulty agreeing on strong sanctions measures.  
This is in part because of the threshold requirement in the United 
Nations Charter that the Security Council determine there to be a 
threat to peace or security.  As Andreas Lowenfeld wryly notes, 
“the content of that determination is a political questions, and a 
 
companies from Europe and the United States out of Sudan, but firms from China, 
Malaysia, India, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are racing in” and that “[d] 
irect foreign investment has shot up to $2.3 billion this year, from $128 million in 
2000, all while the American government has tried to tighten the screws”); see also 
Joanmarie M. Dowling & Mark P. Popiel, War by Sanctions: Are We Targeting 
Ourselves, 11 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 8, 9–12 (2002) (describing harm to U.S. 
economy and business interests from imposition of unilateral sanctions). 
34 Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions: Public Goals and 
Private Compensation, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 305, 307 (2003); see also HUFBAUER ET AL., 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note 11, at 80 tbl.5.1, 125–27 (charting 
the success and failure rates of sanctions from 1970 to 2000). 
35  Symposium on Enhancing the Implementation of United Nations Security 
Council Sanctions, N.Y., U.S., Apr. 30, 2007, Report, p. 4, U.N. Doc S/2007/34, 
available at http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/UNSC-Enhancing 
_Implementation_Sanctions.pdf (suggesting that sanctions achieved at least 
partial success in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Haiti, Angola, Liberia, Sudan (in 1996), 
Cote d’Ivoire, and “perhaps” North Korea); see also David Cortright & George A. 
Lopez, Reforming Sanctions, in THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO 
THE 21ST CENTURY 167, 169 (David Malone ed., 2004) (noting examples of Security 
Council sanctions after 1990 and concluding that “[s]anctions did not produce 
immediate and full compliance in any of the cases examined, but in a number of 
cases they resulted in partial compliance or generated effective diplomatic 
bargaining pressure” and “[i]n about half the cases examined, Security Council 
sanctions had at least some impact”). 
36 Hufbauer & Oegg, supra note 34, at 308 (noting that “[b]etween 1945 and 
1969, U.S. unilateral sanctions achieved their goal in more than seventy percent of 
the cases” but that “after 1970 the success rate dropped below twenty percent”). 
37 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 11, at 128. 
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threat to the peace under Article 39 is whatever the Security 
Council determines to be a threat to the peace.”38  For example, in 
contrast to the United States’ general ban against trade and 
financial transactions with Iran, United Nations sanctions against 
Iran are far weaker, principally including trade restrictions that 
extend only to certain military and dual-use items, as well as travel 
and asset restrictions against just eighteen people and twelve 
companies believed to be involved with Iranian uranium 
enrichment activities.39  Russia and China have used their veto-
wielding clout as permanent members of the Security Council to 
stifle proposals for more aggressive sanctions measures.40  Despite 
 
38 ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 858 (2d ed. 2008). 
39 U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Iran—What 
You Need To Know About U.S. Sanctions (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf (describing 
scope of U.S. unilateral sanctions measures); Warren Hoge & Elaine Sciolino, 
Security Council Adds Sanctions Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/middleeast/04nations.html 
?ref=todayspaper (describing the UN sanctions of Iran which impose cargo 
inspections and the monitoring of Iranian financial institutions); S.C. Res. 1803, ¶ 
16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008) (noting that the European Union has 
imposed its own limited sanctions against Iran); see also Steven Lee Myers, Brown 
Says Europe Will Tighten Iran Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/17/world/17prexy.html?fta=y (noting 
European Union decision to freeze overseas assets of Iran’s largest commercial 
bank). 
40 See, e.g., Helene Cooper & Warren Hoge, Europeans Plan Incentives, as Iran 
Says Sanctions Won’t Halt Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/26/world/europe/26diplo.html (noting that 
“Russia and China, which have deep commercial ties to Iran, have dragged their 
feet over a new sanctions resolution and agreed only recently to a watered-down 
set of sanctions to be brought before the Council,” but that “many diplomats, and 
even some administration officials, say privately that they do not expect much to 
come from the next sanctions resolution, even if it is passed, because the 
resolution is so weak”); Warren Hoge, Draft of New Iran Sanctions Restricts Cargo 
and Travel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/01/26/world/26nations.html (noting agreement to enhanced Security 
Council sanctions resolution against Iran in light of non-compliance with past 
resolutions, but that draft was weakened because of opposition of Russia and 
China to proposals to prohibit financial transactions with Iranian government-
linked banks); Iran’s Nuclear Dossier: Spinning on Regardless, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 
24, 2007, at 51 (noting that as “Iran forges ahead in defiance of the United Nations 
with uranium enrichment at its plant at Natanz,” still “Russia and China are 
blocking efforts at the U.N. Security Council to slap new sanctions on Iran”); 
Nazilah Fathi, Russian Envoy Derides Iran Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/world/middleeast/31iran 
.html (describing Russian Foreign Minister objection to additional sanctions and 
noting that “after two rounds of sanctions, Russia and China have balked at 
escalation to another round”); Helene Cooper, Split in Group Delays Vote on 
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Iran’s refusal to suspend its nuclear enrichment program in 
violation of U.N. resolutions, Russia went forward in December 
2007 with a delivery of nuclear fuel to an Iranian nuclear power 
plant.41 
Similar obstacles have impeded the enactment of 
comprehensive sanctions against the Sudan in response to 
massacres in Darfur.  The United States has imposed stringent 
unilateral sanctions against Sudan,42 but Russia and China have 
resisted proposals to strengthen U.N. multilateral sanctions 
measures.43  While U.S. companies are barred from the petroleum 
and petrochemical sector in Sudan, China—among other 
countries—has capitalized on Sudan’s oil wealth as its primary 
foreign investor; Sudan furnishes up to ten percent of China’s oil 
 
Sanctions Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/29/world/middleeast/29iran.html  
(describing conflicts between United States and Russia over Security Council 
sanctions against Iran); Elissa Gootman, Security Council Approves Sanctions 
Against Iran Over Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res 
=9E0DE5D61131F937A15751C1A9609C8B63 (noting passage of Security Council 
sanctions resolution against Iran but that “[i]t is weaker than proposals in earlier 
drafts, which started circulating in October, after repeated changes intended to 
placate Russia, which has strong economic ties with Iran” and that “[t]hroughout 
the process, Russia’s objections were often seconded by China”). 
41 Helene Cooper, Iran Receives Nuclear Fuel in Blow to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
18, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/world/middleeast 
/18diplo.html (“The United States lost a long battle when Russia . . . delivered 
nuclear fuel to an Iranian power plant that is at the center of an international 
dispute over its nuclear program.”). 
42 31 C.F.R. § 538 (2008) (Sudanese Sanctions Regulations); see also U.S. Dep’t 
of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Sudan—What You Need to Know 
About U.S. Sanctions (July 25, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement 
/ofac/programs/sudan/sudan.pdf (outlining the materials which have been 
prohibited from trade between the U.S. and Sudan); U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. 
Sanctions on Sudan (Fact Sheet) (Apr. 23, 2008), http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf 
/AF/state/103970.pdf (explaining the American rational for imposing sanctions 
in Sudan, which include the Sudanese Presidents failure to end violence in 
Darfur). 
43 Jad Mouawad, Oil May Allow Sudan to Escape Sanctions’ Pain, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 30, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/30/business 
/worldbusiness/30oil.html (noting new round of U.S. unilateral sanctions against 
Sudanese-government-controlled companies and that “[t]he European Union has 
signaled its willingness to consider new sanctions against Sudan, but China and 
Russia have been opposed”). 
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imports, and Sudan’s largest oil company is a joint venture that is 
operated by a Chinese state-owned oil company.44 
China has also forestalled U.N. sanctions against the repressive 
military junta that rules Myanmar.  Since 1997 the United States 
has imposed extensive unilateral sanctions against Myanmar that 
now include a general ban on import of Myanmar products into 
the United States, a ban on export from the United States of 
financial services to Myanmar and blocking of assets of senior 
Myanmar government leaders.45  By contrast, even after 
Myanmar’s violent suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations 
in the fall of 2007, China signaled its “resolute opposition” to 
sanctions and continues as Myanmar’s most important trading 
partner.46 
 
44 Id. (noting that more than half of Sudan’s oil pumped by the Greater Nile 
Petroleum Operating Company, “a joint venture of the Sudanese government and 
state oil companies from China, India and Malaysia, and [that] is operated by the 
China National Petroleum Corporation”); No Strings: Why Developing Countries 
Like Doing Business with China, ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2008, at 15–16 (noting China’s 
investment of $15 billion in the Sudan since 1996 and reliance on Sudanese oil for 
10 percent of its oil imports, which “has given China an incentive to reject 
sanctions on Sudan whenever they have been proposed in the U.N. Security 
Council”); see also Chin-Hao Huang, U.S.-China Relations and Darfur, 31 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 827, 828–30 (2008) (describing extent of Chinese investment and trade 
with Sudan). 
45 31 C.F.R. § 537 (2008) (Burmese Sanctions Regulations); U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Burma—What You Need to Know About 
U.S. Sanctions Against Burma (Myanmar) (Aug. 16, 2005), http://www.treas.gov 
/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/burma/burma.pdf (explaining that in 
response to the Burmese governments large scale repression of the democratic 
opposition, the U.S. was prohibiting new investment in Burma by any American 
citizen); see also United States Imposes More Sanctions to Press Myanmar’s Rulers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06 
/world/asia/06myanmar.html (noting recent steps taken by the U.S. to expand 
assets-blocking sanctions to more persons and entities associated with the 
Myanmar government); Michael Ewing-Chow, First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade 
Sanctions and Human Rights, 5 NW. U.J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 153, 156–61 (2007) 
(describing history of U.S. and EU sanctions against Myanmar). 
46 Howard W. French, China Opposes Sanctions on Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
10, 2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res 
=9D0DE4DB173CF933A25753C1A9619C8B63; Warren Hoge & Seth Mydans, U.N. 
Chief Calls Crackdown in Myanmar ‘Abhorrent’, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/06/world/06nations.html (noting that China 
has argued that sanctions are not warranted as the “crisis does not constitute the 
kind of threat to international peace and security that calls for the involvement if 
the Council”); David Lague, China Braces for Prospect of Changes in Myanmar, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/world 
/asia/27china.html (explaining China’s stake in preventing the downfall of the 
Myanmar government). 
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More recently, Russia and China jointly vetoed a U.S. proposal 
in July 2008 for sanctions against Zimbabwe’s President Robert 
Mugabe and his senior leadership stemming from recent violence 
and electoral abuses.47 Calling the proposal an unwarranted 
interference in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs, Russia’s ambassador 
stated that the proposal exceeded the Security Council’s mandate 
to act only in the event of a threat to international peace and 
security.48  One commentator aptly notes that “the recent dual veto 
[by Russia and China] showed that getting the U.N. to speak in one 
voice against dictatorships, no matter how heinous, has almost 
always been nearly impossible.”49 
Not only do Russia and China often impede U.S. efforts to 
enact U.N. sanctions, but the Security Council has also more 
generally retreated from the use of comprehensive trade embargos 
of the kind levied against Iraq, Haiti, and Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s toward so-called “smart” sanctions that target particular 
individuals and entities deemed most responsible for the 
misconduct of rogue regimes.50  According to the U.N. Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “comprehensive 
economic sanctions or broad trade embargoes are coercive 
measures of the past and . . . in today’s sanctions policies, strategies 
for mitigating adverse humanitarian impacts on vulnerable 
 
47 Neil MacFarquhar, 2 Vetoes Quash U.N. Sanctions on Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/world/africa 
/12zimbabwe.html (relating America’s failed efforts to impose sanctions against 
Zimbabwe due to China and Russia’s decision to veto a proposed sanctions 
resolution, causing the American ambassador to question the Russian reliability 
on human rights matters). 
48 U.N. Sec. Council Dep’t of Pub. Info., Security Council Fails to Adopt 
Sanctions Against Leadership as Two Permanent Members Cast Negative Votes, U.N. 
Doc. SC/9396, (July 11, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press 
/docs/2008/sc9396.doc.htm (noting that the Russian  representative to the U.N. 
Security Council suggested that “lately [there] had been some attempts to take the 
Council beyond its Charter prerogatives of maintaining international peace and 
security.  Such illegitimate and dangerous attempts could ‘unbalance’ the whole 
United Nations system”). 
49 Joshua Hammer, Scandal in Africa, 55 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 13, Aug. 14, 2008, 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21691. 
50 LUCK, supra note 29, at 61–67 (describing transition from comprehensive to 
smart sanctions); Cortright & Lopez, supra note 36, at 169–72 (noting that in 
response to controversy about the humanitarian impact of sanctions, “[g]eneral 
trade embargoes were abandoned in favor of more targeted sanctions,” and 
describing targeted sanctions reform measures). 
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populations have imperatively to be incorporated from the very 
beginning.”51 
Yet while smart sanctions laudably diminish the impact on a 
civilian population of a target state, they lack the economic clout 
that more comprehensive sanctions impose and can be 
circumvented easily through individual targets’ use of aliases and 
nominees to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions.52  As 
Gary Hufbauer notes, “smart sanctions work better as a signaling 
device than as a coercive measure” to prompt a target regime’s 
change of policy.53 
Even when the Security Council reaches consensus on 
sanctions, it is another matter whether the sanctions will be 
rigorously enforced.  More than a decade of U.N. sanctions against 
Iraq exposed the extent to which enforcement of U.N. sanctions 
may be scandalously lacking.  From 1990 to early 2003, 
comprehensive U.N. trade sanctions forbid the former Iraqi regime 
of Saddam Hussein from exporting oil.54  But the Iraqi regime still 
managed to smuggle about $11 billion of oil through neighboring 
countries.55  The most notoriously verifiable smuggling activity 
involved Iraq’s construction and operation of an oil pipeline from 
its northern oil fields near Kirkuk to a port in Syria through which 
 
51 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Impact of 
Sanctions, http://ochaonline.un.org/HumanitarianIssues/ImpactofSanctions 
/tabid/1201/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
52 See, e.g., HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 11, at 139 (noting that smart sanctions 
may be more attractive in theory than in practice); Gary C. Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. 
Schott, Can Sanctions Stop the Iranian Bomb?, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. Mar. 
2006, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchID 
=606 (noting that “broad economic sanctions, comparable to the isolation of Iraq 
in the 1990s, are simply not feasible” against Iran because of higher oil prices and 
because “Russia will continue to cultivate Tehran as its best foothold in the 
Middle East”). 
53 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 11, at 139. 
54 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (initial comprehensive 
sanctions resolution following Iraqi invasion of Kuwait); S.C. Res 687, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991) (imposing additional sanctions on Iraq conditioned on 
its compliance with weapons inspections). 
55 See JEFFREY A. MEYER & MARK G. CALIFANO, GOOD INTENTIONS CORRUPTED: 
THE OIL-FOR-FOOD SCANDAL AND THE THREAT TO THE U.N. 150–51 (2006) (detailing 
the findings of the official investigation of the Independent Inquiry Committee 
investigation led by Paul A. Volcker); see also Independent Inquiry Committee into 
The United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, http://www.iic-offp.org (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2009) (providing the official reports of the Independent Inquiry 
Committee). 
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more than $2 billion in oil was smuggled from 2000 to 2003.56  
Russia—with the support of China and sometimes France—
blocked efforts within the Security Council to investigate 
widespread reports of the smuggling activity.57  Apart from oil 
smuggling, the Iraqi regime extracted about $1.8 billion in secret 
kickbacks from vendors for commercial oil and humanitarian-
goods transactions that were authorized under the U.N.’s Oil-for-
Food Program.58  Iraq sold more oil to companies from Russia and 
China than to companies from any other country; these Russian 
and Chinese companies—including many state-owned 
companies—accounted for a large share of the illegal kickbacks 
paid by contractors under the Oil-for-Food Program.59  Not 
surprisingly in light of the commercial advantages to be reaped, 
Russia and China obstructed proposals in the Security Council to 
investigate and redress allegations of kickbacks paid for the Iraqi 
sale of oil.60 
In short, effective U.N. sanctions are increasingly difficult to 
achieve and enforce, while unilateral sanctions are of diminishing 
effectiveness because of the capacity and willingness of third 
countries to do business with those that the United States shuns.  
This problem suggests considering how the United States can 
make unilateral sanctions more effective, specifically whether the 
United States can leverage primary unilateral sanctions with 
 
56 MEYER & CALIFANO, supra note 55, at 164–171 (describing the Syrian oil 
pipeline and the Security Council committee’s failure to investigate pipeline 
smuggling allegations). 
57 Id. at 168–71 (detailing Russia’s efforts). 
58 Id. at 86, 115, 118 (illustrating kickback payments of $229 million in 
connection with Iraqi oil sales and $1.5 billion in connection with humanitarian-
goods contracts under the Oil-for-Food Program). 
59 Id. at 72 (noting that Russian and Chinese companies received more than 
$19.3 billion and $4.9 billion of oil sales, respectively, amounting to more than 
one-third of the total of $64.2 billion of oil that Iraq was allowed to sell under the 
Oil-for-Food Program); id. at 86–87 (describing large “oil surcharge” cash 
payments from Russian companies—including the Russian state-owned oil 
company that was the largest single purchaser of oil under the Program—that 
were funneled through the Iraqi embassy in Moscow); id. at 106 (noting 
prominence of Russian, Chinese, and French companies for humanitarian 
contracts under the Program); id. at 114, 122–24 (describing extent of kickbacks 
paid for humanitarian contracts under program, and the significant payments by 
specific Russian and Chinese companies). 
60 Id. at 143–49 (describing the pattern of objections raised by Russia with 
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secondary sanctions to induce foreign companies and individuals 
to decline to do business with targets of U.S. sanctions. 
3.  A PLACE FOR SECONDARY SANCTIONS 
Most U.S. unilateral sanctions measures are not designed to 
deter foreigners from doing business with sanction targets.  
Instead, they restrict only the activities of “United States persons” 
in their dealings with the sanction target.  A “United States 
person” is defined to include “any United States citizen, 
permanent resident alien, entity organized under the law of the 
United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the 
United States.”61  This definition principally includes U.S. citizens 
and U.S.-incorporated companies, while excluding all foreign 
citizens, except those who happen to be located in the United 
States.  With notable exceptions for Cuba and North Korea, U.S. 
sanctions measures do not usually apply to foreign-incorporated 
companies, even foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies.62 
 
61 See, e.g., Exec. Order  No. 13,224, § 3(c), 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001) 
(defining the term “United States person” for purposes of sanctions against 
terrorists as “any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized 
under the laws of the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in 
the United States”); Exec. Order No. 13338, § 6(c), 69 Fed. Reg. 26,751 (May 11, 
2004) (providing the same definition for sanctions against Syria); Exec. Order No. 
13413, § 3(c), 71 Fed. Reg. 64,105, 64,106 (Oct. 27, 2006) (establishing the same 
definition of “United States person” for sanctions against the Democratic Republic 
of Congo); 66 Fed. Reg. at 47,081 (defining “person” to include “an individual or 
entity”); 31 C.F.R. § 537.321 (2008) (providing the same definition for sanctions 
against Burma/Myanmar); 31 C.F.R. § 538.315 (2008) (providing the same 
definition for sanctions against Sudan); 31 C.F.R. § 541.312 (2008) (providing the 
same definition for sanctions against Zimbabwe); 31 C.F.R. § 560.314 (2008) 
(providing the same definition of “United States person” for purpose of sanctions 
against Iran). 
62 Sanctions against Cuba and North Korea apply to any “person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States,” a term that is defined more broadly than 
“United States person” to include in part any foreign-incorporated company or 
organization that is “owned or controlled” by a U.S. citizen, resident, or company 
organized under U.S. law.  31 C.F.R. § 500.329(d) (2008) (North Korea); 31 C.F.R. § 
515.329(d) (2008) (Cuba); see also Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial 
Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455, 459–61 (2004) 
(describing the “extraordinary scope” of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba and 
North Korea).  In addition, sometimes sanctions take the form of export controls, 
and U.S. export control laws restrict non-U.S. persons who have received certain 
U.S.-origin goods from re-exporting these goods to Cuba and North Korea and 
also from re-exporting certain licensed goods to a few other sanctioned countries 
including Iran and Sudan.  Id. at 462–65. 
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The term “secondary sanctions” is used in this Article to mean 
any form of economic restriction imposed by a sanctioning or 
sending state (e.g., the United States) that is intended to deter a 
third-party country or its citizens and companies (e.g., France, the 
French people and French companies) from transacting with a 
sanctions target (e.g., a rogue regime, its high government officials, 
or a non-state terrorist entity).  One form of a secondary sanction is 
a secondary trade boycott.  As Andreas Lowenfeld explains, “[i]n a 
secondary boycott, state A says that if X, a national of state C, trades 
with state B [the primary sanctions target], X may not trade with or 
invest in A.”63  The effect, as Lowenfeld notes, is that “X is required 
to make a choice between doing business with or in A, the 
boycotting state, and doing business with or in B, the target state, 
although under the law of C where X is established, trade with 
both A and C is permitted.”64  Another form of a secondary 
sanction is state-mandated divestment.  For example, State A could 
require its nationals to divest from or not to commit future 
investment in X, a national of state C, so long as X trades with state 
B. 
As its name implies, secondary sanctions are supplemental to 
primary sanctions that restrict economic relations directly between 
a sending state (and its own individuals and companies) and a 
target of the sanctions.  The imposition of secondary sanctions 
presupposes that the affected third-party country is a neutral or an 
ally of the target state—that the third-party country has not itself 
instituted comparable sanctions to prohibit its own citizens and 
companies from doing business with the target regime.  
“Secondary sanctions and secondary incentives differ from other 
sanctions or incentives in that they are not directed toward the 
primary target, but rather are directed against third parties in an 
attempt to [change] their behavior or their policies regarding the 
primary target.”65 
Secondary sanctions have proved highly controversial.  The 
Arab League, for example, has long promoted a secondary 
sanctions policy among its members to condition the sale of oil on 
 
63 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. 
INT’L LAW 419, 429 (1996) (emphasis in original). 
64 Id. at 429–30. 
65 GEORGE E. SHAMBAUGH, STATES, FIRMS, AND POWER: SUCCESSFUL SANCTIONS 
IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 4 (1999). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/5
 
2009] SECONDARY SANCTIONS 927 
the agreement of buyers that they not do business with Israel.66  
The United States prohibits its citizens and companies from 
complying with the Arab League policy or any other nation’s 
boycott policies.67 
Still, despite the controversial Arab League example, the 
United States itself occasionally resorts to secondary sanction 
measures.  In 1982, for example, the United States sought to 
impede the construction of a pipeline from the former Communist 
Soviet Union to Western Europe.  It not only prohibited U.S. 
companies from providing parts and services, but also most 
controversially extended this prohibition to foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. companies.68  Amid a storm of protest from the United States’ 
Western European trading partners decrying the regulations as 
improperly “extraterritorial” and a Dutch court decision declining 
to allow its enforcement against a Dutch subsidiary of a U.S. 
company, the United States retracted its extension of the export 
control regulations within several months of their issuance.69 
 
66 See Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can 
Foreign Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 283, 286–88 (2003) 
(reviewing the history of the Arab League boycott).  See generally Martin A. Weiss, 
Arab League Boycott of Israel, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, Apr. 19, 2006, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/65777.pdf (providing an overview 
of the Arab League boycott and U.S. efforts to end it). 
67 See 15 C.F.R. pt. 760 (2008) (codifying U.S. anti-boycott regulations); see also 
Edward O. Weant III, The U.S. Antiboycott Law and Regulation of the Export 
Administration Acts, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2007 221, 224 (Evan R. 
Berlack & Christopher R. Wall eds., 2007) (noting that the U.S. anti-boycott 
regulations are applicable not only to U.S. companies but any “controlled in fact” 
foreign subsidiaries); 15 C.F.R. § 760.1 (2008) (defining a person to include any 
controlled in fact foreign subsidiaries).  See generally Clif Burns, Boeing Subsidiary 
Fined for Anti-Boycott Violations, EXPORT LAW BLOG, June 4, 2008, 
http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/344 (reporting that recently, for 
example, a U.S.-based Boeing subsidiary was fined $3,600 because its Singapore-
based subsidiary failed to report and repudiate a contractual provision requiring 
it to refrain from doing business with Israel). 
68 See LOWENFELD, supra note 38, at 913 (describing new regulations that 
extended to foreign subsidiaries); see also Carter, supra note 10, at 1194–95 
(describing pipeline controls against the Soviet Union); William S. Dodge, The 
Helms-Burton Act and Transnational Legal Process, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 713, 721–22 (1997) (discussing the nature and extent of the Soviet Union 
pipeline sanctions). 
69 See LOWENFELD, supra note 38, at 914–15 (explaining that the United States 
eventually retracted its extension of export control regulations); see also European 
Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the U.S.S.R., 
21 I.L.M. 891, 893 (1982) (“The U.S. measures as they apply in the present case are 
unacceptable under international law because of their extra-territorial aspects.  
They seek to regulate companies not of U.S. nationality in respect of their conduct 
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Equally controversial was the U.S. effort in 1996 to use 
secondary sanctions measures to broaden the impact of existing 
primary sanctions against Cuba.  With the passage of the Helms-
Burton Act in 1996, Congress sought to deter foreign citizens and 
companies from economic relations with Cuba involving any 
property that Cuba had previously expropriated from U.S. 
citizens.70  Deeming these economic relationships to constitute 
wrongful “trafficking” in expropriated property, Congress denied 
“traffickers” the right to enter the United States and authorized 
U.S. victims of expropriation to file suit in U.S. courts for treble 
damages against foreign “traffickers” of expropriated property.71  
Wrongful “trafficking” activity included not only participation in 
the purchase, sale, or transfer of expropriated property, but also 
managing, leasing, possessing, using, or “enter[ing] into a 
commercial arrangement using or otherwise benefiting from 
confiscated property.”72  Thus, as Andreas Lowenfeld notes: 
[T]he Act contemplated that if, say, an English company 
purchased sugar from a Cuban state enterprise and it 
also . . . was amenable to judicial jurisdiction in the United 
States, it would be liable to a U.S. national who could show 
that some of the English company’s purchases consisted of 
sugar grown on the plantation that the plaintiff once 
 
outside the United States and particularly the handling of property and technical 
data of these companies not within the United States. . . .  [They] run   counter to 
the two generally accepted bases of jurisdiction in international law; the 
territoriality and the nationality principles.”); Compagnie Européenne des 
Pétroles S.A./Sensor Nederland B.V. [Rb. Den Haag] [District Court], 17 
september 1982 (Neth.), translated in 22 I.L.M. 66, 72–73 (1983) (concluding that 
export control regulations as applied to Dutch subsidiary of a U.S. company are 
not justifiable on grounds of territoriality, nationality, or protective jurisdictional 
principles). 
70 See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 
U.S.C. §§ 6021–91 (2006) (codifying laws that discouraged foreigners and 
organizations from partaking in transactions involving property Cuba had 
confiscated from U.S. nationals); see also Clark, supra note 63, at 466–71 (describing 
major provisions of the Helms-Burton Act). 
71 See 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (1996) (enumerating a civil liability provision for 
trafficking in confiscated property claimed by U.S. nationals); 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a) 
(1996) (providing a denial of entry provision extending not only to persons 
directly involved in “trafficking” but also, for any “trafficking” transaction 
conducted in the name of a foreign corporation, denying entry to any “corporate 
officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling interest” in the corporation, as 
well as to the “spouse, minor child or agent” of such individual). 
72  22 U.S.C. § 6091(b)(2) (1996). 
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owned.73 
Also in 1996, Congress enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act (now known as the Iran Sanctions Act) that aimed to deter 
investment by non-U.S. companies in the oil production sectors of 
Iran and Libya.74  As amended to date, the Act provides that for 
any non-U.S. company that invests within one year more than $40 
million in the Iranian oil sector, the President is required to select 
at least two sanctions from the following menu of retaliatory 
measures: 
 denial of any export licenses and approvals for products to 
be shipped to any sanctioned person; 
 denial of Export-Import Bank assistance in connection with 
any products to be exported to any sanctioned person; 
 prohibiting U.S. banks from loaning more than $10 million 
in one year to any sanctioned person (subject to certain 
exceptions); 
 procurement debarment of sanctioned persons from U.S. 
government contracts; 
 import restrictions against the sanctioned person; and 
 denial of certain U.S.-government-linked banking privileges 
(in the case of sanctioned entities that are financial 
institutions).75 
Both the Cuba and Iran/Libya laws were vehemently 
condemned as “extraterritorially” illegal by the U.S.’s major 
trading partners, some of whom enacted their own retaliatory laws 
to block or offset any damage to their companies’ business 
interests.76  The United States ultimately relented by means of 
 
73 LOWENFELD, supra note 38, at 923; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 64, at 426 
(providing the same example). 
74 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–172, 110 Stat. 1541 
(1996) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1996)) (imposing sanctions on persons making 
investments contributing to Iran or Libya’s abilities to develop its petroleum 
sector); see generally Kenneth Katzmann, The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), CRS REPORT 
FOR CONGRESS, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20871.pdf 
(describing the history and scope of the statute); Ian Talley, U.S. Senate Panel OKs 
Stronger Financial Sanctions Against Iran, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2008 (noting the 
pending bill in the U.S. Senate to penalize U.S. parent companies of foreign 
subsidiaries that invest in Iranian oil sector). 
75 Iran Sanctions Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1996). 
76 See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, Clinton Troubleshooter Discovers Big Troubles from 
Allies on Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A1 (noting, of the Helms-Burton Act, 
that “its critics in Mexico, Canada and Europe have called it an ‘extraterritorial’ 
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presidential waiver of application of the disputed secondary 
sanctions provisions.77 
As these examples show, secondary sanctions often prove 
politically problematic.  The resentment of third-party countries 
may divert attention from the wrongful conduct of the target 
regime and undermine U.S. efforts to rally multilateral consensus 
for United Nations trade sanctions.78  Still, as George Shambaugh 
notes, “[w]hat critics misunderstand is that secondary sanctions 
tend to cause intergovernmental conflict precisely because they can 
provide an effective means for states to influence the activities of 
foreign firms and individuals operating abroad.”79 
Many state and local governments in the United States have 
pursued their own secondary sanctions measures by means of 
 
effort by the United States to impose its foreign policy on others” and that 
“President Ernesto Zedillo [of Mexico] said it was ‘simply a violation of 
international law’”); Organization of American States, Opinion of the Inter-
American Juridical Committee on Resolution, Freedom of Trade and Investment in 
the Hemisphere, AG/DOC.3375/96, Aug. 23, 1996, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1326, 1334  
(“[T]he exercise of jurisdiction by a State over acts of ‘trafficking’ by aliens abroad, 
under circumstances whereby neither the alien nor the conduct in question has 
any connection with its territory and there is no apparent connection between 
such acts and the protection of its essential sovereign interests, does not conform 
with international law.”); Council Regulation 2271/96, Protecting Against the 
Effects of the Extra-territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third 
Country, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC) (providing a European Union regulation 
prohibiting compliance with Helms-Burton and Iran/Libya statutes); Cleveland, 
Norm Internalization, supra note 7, at 60–61 (describing blocking and retaliatory 
measures by Canada, Mexico, and the European Union); Dodge, supra note 68, at 
718–19 (“[T]he foreign response to Helms-Burton has been swift and vehement.”). 
77 See, e.g., Cleveland, Norm Internalization, supra note 7, at 60–61 (discussing 
President Clinton’s waiver of sanctions due to international outrage); Stefaan Smis 
& Kim Van der Borght, The EU-U.S. Compromise on the Helms-Burton and D’Amato 
Acts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 227, 231–35 (1999) (describing the United States’ willingness 
to grant waivers to EU member states). 
78 See, e.g., Cleveland, Norm Internalization, supra note 7, at 64 (noting “general 
consensus of the international community . . . that Helms-Burton—and 
particularly the Title III provision for suits against third parties—in fact abuses 
and distorts international law norms to serve peculiarly U.S. interests” and that 
such “secondary boycott provisions undermine the moral and normative 
persuasive power of U.S. unilateral sanctions measures and divert attention from 
the human rights message being promoted to the legitimacy of the selected 
messenger”); O’SULLIVAN, supra note 29, at 216–17, 302 (contending that the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act “did not help catalyze international support for measures 
against Libya, but rather impeded them” and “threatened to instigate a trade war 
and jeopardize U.S.-European cooperation on other issues”; further contending 
that “[p]olicymakers should not delude themselves by thinking that secondary 
sanctions offer a potential vehicle to multilateral cooperation”). 
79 SHAMBAUGH, supra note 65, at 161. 
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procurement-barring measures and divestment from third-country 
companies that do business with odious regimes.80  More than 25 
states have adopted legislation to divest from companies that do 
business in Sudan and 11 states have adopted legislation to divest 
public pension fund assets from companies that do business in 
Iran.81  In view that U.S. companies are already mostly barred from 
doing business with Sudan or Iran,82 the effect of these debarment 
and divestment measures falls heavily on foreign companies. 
Although state procurement bars and divestment measures 
have been challenged as an infringement on the federal 
government’s foreign affairs power,83 Congress and the President 
have recently approved the Sudan Accountability and Divestment 
Act to authorize states and local government to divest from and 
prohibit investment of their assets in companies with business 
operations in the oil, mineral extraction, power production, and 
military sectors of the Sudan.84  The new law also adds a federal 
 
80 See Sudan Divestment Taskforce, Divestment Statistics: Figures for States, 
Universities, Cities, International & Religious Organizations and Countries, Oct. 15, 
2008, http://www.sudandivestment.org/statistics.asp (compiling a list of twenty-
seven states and twenty-three cities that have adopted Sudanese divestment 
policies). 
81 See Brian Radzinsky, U.S. States Continue to Divest from Businesses Tied to 
Iran, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, July 2, 2008, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com 
/Article.aspx?id=2371 (citing specific states that have enacted divestment 
legislation); see also Jesse McKinley, California Seeks to Ban Investment in Iran, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007, at A14 (reporting specifically about California’s divestment 
legislation). 
82 See supra notes 12–13, 42 and accompanying text. 
83 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (invalidating 
under the Supremacy Clause a Massachusetts law restricting the ability of state 
government to do business with companies doing business with Burma); Nat’l 
Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(invalidating under the Supremacy Clause an Illinois law imposing restrictions on 
investment of public pension funds in Sudan-connected entities and restrictions 
on the deposit of state funds in financial institutions with customers that have 
certain types of connections with Sudan). 
84 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Signs Bill Allowing Sudan Divestment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2008, at A7 (reporting that President Bush signed into law the Sudan 
Accountability and Divestment Act after both houses of Congress passed the bill 
that would allow local and state governments to stop investing in companies that 
do business in Sudan); Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 (SADA), 
Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121 Stat. 2516 (2007) (“An Act to authorize State and local 
governments to divest assets in companies that conduct business operations in 
Sudan, to prohibit United States Government contracts with such companies, and 
for other purposes.”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,412, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,369, §§ 1–2 
(Oct. 17, 2006) (revealing that although SADA applies to all companies, its 
practical effect is to encourage divestment from foreign companies, because U.S. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
 
932 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:3 
procurement sanction, requiring all contractors with federal 
executive agencies to certify that they do not conduct the specified 
business operations in the Sudan.85 
Similarly, U.S. sanctions against Myanmar not only prohibit 
U.S. persons from investing directly there but—in secondary-
sanctions fashion—prohibit them from buying shares in a third-
country company if the company’s profits are predominantly 
derived from its economic development of resources located in 
Myanmar.86  In addition, U.S. persons are prohibited from 
approving, financing, facilitating, or guaranteeing a transaction in 
Myanmar by a person who is a foreign person if the transaction 
would be prohibited if performed by a U.S. person or within the 
United States.87 
These developments suggest that secondary sanctions are here 
to stay, at least so long as the United States realizes that it cannot 
achieve its foreign policy goals through unilateral sanctions alone 
and, as increasingly common, where multilateral sanctions from 
the U.N. are not possible to achieve.  As politically contentious as 
secondary sanctions may prove to be, they surely remain 
preferable to using military force. 
4.  THE JURISDICTIONAL VALIDITY OF SECONDARY SANCTIONS 
The political controversy about secondary sanctions is 
complicated by questions about their legality under international 
law.  The conventional wisdom holds that secondary sanctions are 
an impermissible “extraterritorial” extension of U.S. jurisdiction 
that impinges on the rights of neutral states to regulate their own 
 
companies are already prohibited from doing business relating to the petroleum 
and petro-chemical industries in Sudan). 
85 See SADA § 6 (enumerating a certification requirement that the contractor 
does not conduct business in Sudan). 
86 See 31 C.F.R. § 537.204 (2008) (prohibiting “new investment” in Burma by 
U.S. persons); 31 C.F.R. § 537.311 (2008) (defining “new investment” to include 
control of or investment in third-party entities that invest in Burma); see generally, 
United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 
Burma—What You Need To Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Burma (Myanmar) 
(Dec. 5, 2008) 3, http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs 
/burma/burma.pdf (stating that the regulations also prohibit U.S. companies 
from contracting to supervise or guarantee the performance of any foreign person 
in the performance of a contract that includes the economic development of 
resources located in Burma). 
87 See 31 C.F.R. § 537.305 (2008) (prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation 
of financial services). 
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citizens and companies.  For example, Sarah Cleveland notes the 
criticism by others of “‘[e]xtraterritorial’ sanctions, or secondary 
boycotts . . . since they purport to exercise authority over foreign 
states and entities for engaging in conduct (business with third 
countries) that has no jurisdictional nexus with the sanctioning 
state.”88  Similarly, Peter Fitzgerald claims: 
[A]n international consensus does appear to be building 
that the unilateral extraterritorial application of these 
controls [sanctions] to third parties is impermissible . . . . 
[T]he international community is coming to regard the 
blacklisting of third parties, or secondary boycotts, as 
“unreasonable,” and therefore an unjustifiable intrusion 
upon the sovereignty of the neutral state.89 
To the same effect, Andreas Lowenfeld argues that “secondary 
boycott” measures such as the Helms-Burton Act and the Arab 
League boycott are “contrary to international law, because [they] 
seek[] unreasonably to coerce conduct that takes place wholly 
outside of the state purporting to exercise its jurisdiction to 
prescribe.”90  He further suggests that “[w]hile no precise rules 
have been formulated, it seems that in the areas of sanctions . . . 
customary international law places limits on unilateral 
extraterritorial measures.”91  Other commentators have joined the 
chorus casting doubt on the legality of secondary sanctions 
measures.92 
 
88 Cleveland, Norm Internalization, supra note 7, at 56–57.  Although noting the 
criticism by others of secondary sanctions, Cleveland does not resolve their 
legality and suggests that they could be warranted in cases of third-country actors 
that aid-and-abet human rights abuses of a target regime.  Id. at  63–64; see also 
Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions, supra note 7, at 158 (noting that “[w]hile the 
validity of secondary boycott measures is beyond the scope of this article, the 
WTO’s approach to extraterritoriality generally has broad implications for human 
rights sanctions”). 
89 Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in 
U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 91 (1998). 
90 Lowenfeld, supra note 63, at 430. 
91 LOWENFELD, supra note 38, at 926. 
92 See, e.g., Cedric Ryngaert, Extraterritorial Export Controls (Secondary 
Boycotts), 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 625, 626, 655 (2008) (stating that “[i]t is no surprise 
that secondary boycotts raise serious public international law concerns” and that 
“[i]n view of foreign nations’ repeated and unisonous rejections of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction used as a (the United States) foreign policy tool boosting the efficiency 
of U.S. economic boycotts, it might be argued that secondary boycotts are illegal 
under international law”); see also J. Brett Busby, Jurisdiction to Limit Third-Country 
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As an initial issue, it is fair to question whether the 
jurisdictional legality of secondary sanctions matters.  After all, 
under the last-in-time rule the United States is free to supplant 
customary rules of international jurisdiction without fear that any 
U.S. court will decide international law to be controlling.93  Nor is it 
likely that any international tribunal’s invalidation of a U.S. 
secondary sanctions measure would be given effect under U.S. 
law.94 
 
Interaction with Sanctioned States: The Iran and Libya Sanctions and Helms-Burton 
Acts, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 621, 624 (1998) (contending that Helms-Burton 
and Iran/Libya statutes “go well beyond previous assertions of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by the United States” and that “they have no firm international 
jurisdictional basis”); Richard G. Alexander, Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996: 
Congress Exceeds Its Jurisdiction to Prescribe Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1601, 1633–
34 (1997) (arguing that the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act is illegal under 
international law).  But see Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is 
Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 434, 435–36 (1996) (contending 
that Helms-Burton Act is justified by effects doctrine). 
93 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (noting that “an Act of 
Congress . . . is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is 
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict 
renders the treaty null”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Curtis A. 
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 331 (2001) 
(“Congress is free to override the limitations of international law, including the 
international law of prescriptive jurisdiction, when enacting a criminal statute.”).  
This is not to say that the international customary law of jurisdiction has no effect 
in U.S. courts because, as the Supreme Court has recently noted, when declining 
to apply ambiguous antitrust law to foreign company conduct causing foreign 
economic harm, it “ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid 
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations,” and 
“[t]his rule of construction reflects principles of customary international law—law 
that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to follow.”  F. Hoffman-LaRoche 
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).  This interpretive rule does not 
apply to the statutes considered in this Article because they are not asserted to be 
ambiguous in scope. 
94 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (declining to enforce 
judgment of the International Court of Justice to remedy violation of the consular 
notification requirement of the Vienna Convention for Consular Relations).  In 
any event, the United States would not bear the burden ab initio to establish the 
jurisdictional validity of its sanctions measure; under the well-established “Lotus 
principle,” the burden would remain on other country complainants to show that 
the United States exceeded its jurisdictional authority.  See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).  Although this Article does not address 
whether secondary sanctions may violate the obligations of the United States 
under trade law treaties, it is notable that complaints filed in the WTO against the 
United States arising from the Helms-Burton Act did not result in a final decision 
on the statute’s legal validity.  See Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions, supra note 7, 
at 136 n.17 (describing WTO complaints by the EC against the United States 
arising from the Helms-Burton Act). 
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Still, despite the likely lack of enforceable limits, the legal 
validity of secondary sanctions retains important symbolic value 
that impacts the political calculation about whether to use them.95  
The reasons why nations may try to comply with the international 
customary law of jurisdiction—even in the absence of an 
international compliance mechanism—are beyond the scope of this 
Article.  As Andrew Guzman suggests, even in the absence of a 
formal enforcement mechanism for a violation of customary 
international law (CIL), “[t]he sanctions for a violation of CIL may 
take the form of an unwillingness on the part of other states to rely 
on compliance with CIL by the violating state (reputation), a 
reluctance on the part of other parties to comply with that same 
norm (a form of reciprocity), or the imposition of a direct sanction 
(a form of retaliation).“96  In short, if secondary sanctions are 
viewed not merely as politically problematic but outright illegal, 
they are less likely to be considered as a policy option, much less 
are they likely to be accepted by other countries without retaliation 
measures of the kind that ensued after passage of the Helms-
Burton and Iran Libya Sanctions Acts. 
The common condemnation of secondary sanctions as 
“extraterritorial” overlooks the fact that all sanctions measures—
primary or secondary—seek to effect an extraterritorial change in 
conduct.  Even when the United States imposes unilateral 
sanctions directly against a rogue regime (without any secondary 
component against actors from neutral third countries), it acts 
“extraterritorially” in the sense of striving to change conduct 
occurring beyond U.S. borders.  This point has been 
 
95 See Cleveland, Norm Internalization, supra note 7, at 86 (suggesting that 
secondary sanctions measures “simply focus the attention of the international 
community on the legality of the extraterritorial sanctions rather than on the 
substantive violations of the target state”).  Cf. Charnovitz, supra note 7, at 691 
(“[I]f a morally-motivated trade measure violates international trade rules, then 
employing it anyway undermines the rule of law and subverts values that may be 
dear to the country contemplating a trade measure.”). 
96 ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 2008-09 (2008); see 
also id. at 7, 33–37 (describing schools of theory about why nations obey 
international law and focusing on the “‘Three R’s of Compliance’—reputation, 
reciprocity, and retaliation” as primary rational-choice motivations for nations to 
comply with international law); Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006) (emphasizing self-interest of nations in deciding to 
“comply” with international law); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey 
International Law? 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997) (discussing role of transnational legal 
process and norm internalization as reasons why nations “obey” international 
law). 
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misunderstood by commentators who assert that a state’s primary 
sanctions are regulation of a state’s own nationals, while a state’s 
secondary sanctions are not.97  Consider, for example, a sanctions 
law prohibiting U.S. citizens from trading with Myanmar (primary 
sanctions) or with any third-country that does business with 
Myanmar (secondary sanctions); both aspects of this sanctions law 
equally regulate the conduct of U.S. nationals.  Unless the critics of 
secondary sanctions are prepared to denounce all forms of 
sanctions as prohibitively “extraterritorial,”98 the legality of 
secondary sanctions cannot rise or fall on the basis of their purpose 
or intent to affect extraterritorial conduct alone. 
The jurisdictional validity of secondary sanctions should be 
measured in light of well-established principles governing the 
authority of each nation-state as against other nation-states to 
regulate the conduct of individuals, companies, and other sub-
national actors.  As briefly discussed below, these customary 
international jurisdictional guidelines encompass the traditional 
tripartite authority of every nation-state to prescribe rules of 
conduct, to enforce the prescribed rules of conduct, and to adjudicate 
specific cases for the purpose either of prescribing or enforcing 
rules of conduct.99  Together, these guidelines form the basis for 
 
97 Lowenfeld, supra note 63, at 429 (“a primary boycott does not usually raise 
issues of international law, because the boycotting state is exercising its 
jurisdiction in its own territory or over its own nationals”); Bartels, supra note 8, at 
385  (noting that “something must be said of the fact that in the case of expressly 
coercive trade restrictions, it is only boycotts affecting nationals of third states 
(secondary boycotts) that are seen to raise extraterritoriality issues, while boycotts 
directed at the target state (primary boycotts) are usually not considered in this 
light” and concluding that the “true reason” for this is because primary boycotts 
“are indeed extraterritorial, but they are legitimately extraterritorial to the extent 
that they apply to the nationals of the regulating state”). 
98 See LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 38, at 891 
(noting that despite a provision in the Charter of the Organization of American 
States prohibiting “‘coercive measures of an economic or political character in 
order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of 
any kind,’” that “the frequent use of sanctions by the United States and many 
other countries constitutes persuasive evidence that no clear norm exists in 
customary law against the use of economic sanctions”) (citing Charter of the 
Organization of American States, art. 19, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. 6847). 
99 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. IV, introductory 
note, § 401 (1987) (reaffirming the traditional triparte authority of every nation); 
see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting that “[t]here is, however, a type of ‘jurisdiction’ relevant to determining 
the extraterritorial reach of a statute; it is known as ‘legislative jurisdiction,’ or 
‘jurisdiction to prescribe.’  This refers to ‘the authority of a state to make its law 
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what William Dodge calls “the ‘structural rules of transnational 
law’:  rules concerning prescriptive jurisdiction, judicial 
jurisdiction, and the enforcement of judgments that together 
determine the effectiveness of transnational regulation.”100 
The primary authority to make rules of conduct—prescriptive 
jurisdiction—turns principally on consideration of four sometimes 
overlapping factors relevant to a state’s interest in regulating 
conduct: 
territorial and effects jurisdiction—the regulating state’s interest 
in governing conduct occurring in its own territory (territorial 
jurisdiction) or conduct outside its territory that has or is intended 
to have a substantial effect inside its territory (effects 
jurisdiction);101 
nationality jurisdiction—the regulating state’s interest in 
governing conduct of its own nationals wherever they may be 
located;102 
 
applicable to persons or activities,’ and is quite a separate matter from 
‘jurisdiction to adjudicate’”) (internal citations omitted). 
100 William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L. J. 161, 
162 (2002). 
101 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1) (1987) 
(noting that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . (a) 
conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the 
status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; (c) conduct 
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its 
territory”); see also Bradley, supra note 93, at 323 (“Under the territorial category, a 
nation may regulate conduct within its territory as well as foreign conduct that 
has substantial effects or intended effects in its territory.”); Hoffmann-La Roche v. 
Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (“[O]ur courts have long held that application 
of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is nonetheless reasonable, 
and hence consistent with principles of prescriptive comity, insofar as they reflect 
a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive 
conduct has caused.”) (emphasis added).  Cf. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 
(1911) (stating that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce 
and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause 
of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in 
getting him within its power.”). 
102 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987) 
(noting that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . . the 
activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its 
territory”); see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 
909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that “[t]he citizenship of an individual or 
nationality of a corporation has long been a recognized basis which will support 
the exercise of jurisdiction by a state over persons,” and that “a state has 
jurisdiction to prescribe law governing the conduct of its nationals whether the 
conduct takes place inside or outside the territory of the state.”); see also United 
States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a federal 
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passive personality jurisdiction—the regulating state’s interest in 
governing conduct taken against or harming its nationals;103 and 
protective jurisdiction—the regulating state’s interest in 
governing conduct that threatens its security or essential 
government functions.104 
In addition to the traditional grounds for prescriptive 
jurisdiction identified above, customary law affords each state the 
option to assert universal jurisdiction—that is, “to define and 
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the 
community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave 
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and 
perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”105  In short, as Curtis Bradley 
has noted, “[u]nless a nation’s extraterritorial law falls within one 
of five categories—territoriality, nationality, protective principle, 
passive personality, or universality—it is said, the nation violates 
international law rules governing ‘prescriptive jurisdiction.’”106 
More than one state may lay claim to one or more of these 
jurisdictional connections.  Accordingly, as the Restatement of 
 
statute criminalizing U.S. citizens’ involvement in illicit commercial sexual 
conduct in Cambodia is consistent with the “nationality” principle of international 
jurisdiction). 
103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987); see 
also id. § 402 cmt. g (noting that the “passive personality principle” is not 
“generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as 
applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state’s nations by reason or 
their nationality”); Bradley, supra note 93, at 323 n.4 (noting “substantial debate 
and uncertainty concerning the legitimacy of the passive personality category” 
but that “this category has become increasingly accepted in recent years for 
certain kinds of conduct, such as terrorism.”). 
104 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3) (1987) 
(noting that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . . certain 
conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against 
the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.”); id. 
§402(3) cmt. f (noting application of “protective principle” not only to “offenses 
directed against the security of the state” but also “other offenses threatening the 
integrity of governmental functions . . . e.g., espionage, counterfeiting of the state’s 
seal or currency, falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before 
consular officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws.”).  
The protective principle “refers to the safety and integrity of the state apparatus 
itself . . . not its overall physical and moral well-being.”  Eugene Kontorovich, 
Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction 
Over Drug Crimes 31 (Nw. U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Group, Series No. 08–12) (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1120892. 
105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987). 
106 Bradley, supra note 93, at 323. 
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Foreign Relations Law suggests, a state should refrain from 
asserting prescriptive jurisdiction if to do so would be 
“unreasonable” in light of the competing ties and interests of other 
states in regulating the actor or conduct at issue.107  The 
Restatement lists a broad range of “reasonableness” factors, such 
as the nature of the activity; the extent to which it takes place in the 
territory of the regulating state; the strength of ties such as 
nationality, residence, and business activity between the regulating 
state and the person subject to regulation; the “importance” of 
regulation to the regulating state; and the existence of, interest in, 
and conflict with regulation of the activity by other states.108  Many 
of these factors are redundant of the initial jurisdictional factors, 
and the Restatement does not furnish further guidance how to 
reconcile competing jurisdictional claims.109 
Apart from the power to prescribe is the power to enforce 
prescriptive rules.  Enforcement and prescriptive jurisdiction are 
linked; a nation may enforce a rule of conduct only if, among other 
factors, it has underlying jurisdiction to prescribe the rule to be 
 
107 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987) 
(describing “reasonableness” limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction); see also 
Hartford Fire v. California, 509 U.S. 815, 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“[u]nder the Restatement, a nation having some ‘basis’ for jurisdiction to prescribe 
law should nonetheless refrain from exercising that jurisdiction ‘with respect to a 
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such 
jurisdiction is unreasonable’” and listing “reasonableness” factors) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403).  But see Bradley, supra note 93, at 
324 n.5 (noting that “[t]here has been some debate over whether international law 
in fact imposes a reasonableness limitation”).  Although the Restatement’s 
“reasonableness” factors of § 403 are said to apply only to the first four grounds 
for prescriptive jurisdiction of § 402, it is not clear why the same reasonableness 
concerns would not come into play in cases of competing claims to redress a 
violation of international law warranting the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
108 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2) (1987); see also 
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing several factors). 
109 Perhaps in part for this reason debate persists about whether section 403 
sets forth a rule of international “law” or more in the nature of a courtesy 
principle of comity.  See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 47 (1991) (“The Restatement’s intent to move beyond the classical 
doctrine to an unconditional, legally-mandated rule reveals a discomfort with 
comity as a mediating principle.  The Restatement’s multifactor-balancing 
approach may seem appealing because it purports to do justice and to re-focus the 
vagueness that characterizes comity.  Yet this balancing approach, like the 
classical doctrine, is difficult to justify in law or policy.”); David B. Massey, How 
the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonableness Requirement 
of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 419 (1997) (contending 
that section 403 does not state customary international law). 
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enforced.110  Relatedly, each nation-state has the power to 
adjudicate in addition to the power to prescribe rules and enforce 
them (often through the adjudication process).  Although a 
nation’s authority to adjudicate does not necessarily require a 
nation-state to have underlying prescriptive jurisdiction, its 
exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction must be “reasonable” in light 
of the affected person’s presence, residence, nationality, or pursuit 
of activities within or affecting the state that seeks to adjudicate.111 
How then do these jurisdictional rules apply to secondary 
sanctions?  Consider an easy example first.  The United States has 
broad trade sanctions against Iran because of the threat posed by 
Iran’s nuclear weapons program.112  These primary sanctions are 
plainly justified on a theory of protective or effects jurisdiction—
the necessity to protect against Iran’s potential use of nuclear 
weapons against the United States.  If the United States learned 
that third-country individuals and companies were supplying 
nuclear weapons materials to Iran, it could impose secondary trade 
sanctions against these third-country actors.113  As with the 
primary sanctions directly against Iran, secondary sanctions by the 
United States against other actors that aid-and-abet Iran’s nuclear 
activities would be equally supportable on a theory of protective 
and effects jurisdiction.114 
 
110 See LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 38, at 901 (“It is 
clear that a state does not have jurisdiction to enforce a law or regulation that it 
did not have jurisdiction to prescribe.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 431(2) (1987) (requiring in part that the enforcement measures—
administrative or judicial—(1) be reasonably related to the rule, (2) any penalty 
for non-compliance be preceded by an appropriate determination of a violation 
(usually involving notice and an opportunity for the alleged violator to be heard), 
and (3) any penalty be proportional to the seriousness of the violation). 
111 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421 cmt. a (1987). 
112 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
113 See Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (July 1, 2005) (blocking 
property of persons engaged in activity involving proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and their support network); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2798 (2006) 
(requiring the President to impose sanctions against any foreign person that 
knowingly and materially contributes “through the export from any other country 
of any goods or technology that would be, if they were United States goods or 
technology, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” to the efforts of certain 
foreign countries “to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire 
chemical or biological weapons.”). 
114 See Cleveland, Norm Internalization, supra note 7, at 63–64 (noting that 
secondary sanctions are permissible against third-country actors that aid-and-abet 
a target regime’s human rights violations).  For example, U.S. law imposes 
sanctions against foreign governments that sell MANPADs (portable surface-to-
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But apart from these clear cases of a third party’s aiding-and-
abetting of hostile activity, a more difficult question is posed by the 
use of secondary sanctions against third-country actors that do no 
more than engage in ordinary civilian business dealings with an 
evil regime or other sanctions target.  Suppose, for example, that 
Iran buys chocolate for civilian use from one of the world’s largest 
food product companies—Nestlé in Switzerland.  The case for 
protective or effects jurisdiction to sanction Nestlé is far more 
debatable, because the threat to the United States occasioned by 
Nestlé’s sales of chocolate to Iran is highly attenuated and because 
secondary sanctions against third parties are at best an indirect 
means to change the conduct of the primary target of sanctions.115 
This contestability of the grounds for jurisdiction makes the 
U.S. decision to impose secondary sanctions legally tenuous and 
hence even more politically problematic.  The exercise of 
jurisdiction quickly becomes vulnerable to claims that the harm or 
effects to the United States is not real or has been exaggerated in a 
manner incommensurate with the costs imposed on third country 
actors.  Switzerland, for example, may contend that the U.S. 
invocation of protective or effects jurisdiction is not reasonable 
given Switzerland’s established grounds of territoriality and 
nationality to regulate the business conduct of Nestlé. 
This kind of debate has parallels to the Commerce Clause 
debate under U.S. domestic law about the prescriptive 
jurisdictional power of Congress to regulate activity affecting the 
 
air missile systems) to terrorist organizations or terrorism-supporting countries.  
See 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2006) (describing Congress’s intentions for arms export 
control in light of foreign policy ideals); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 1901–08 (2006) 
(blocking property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of persons 
materially assisting the international narcotics trafficking activities of persons 
designated as significant foreign narcotics traffickers). 
115 Even dictators likely spend some funds legitimately.  For example, 
although the investigation of the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq established 
that more than 2,000 foreign companies paid approximately $1.8 billion in 
kickbacks to Saddam Hussein’s government from 2000 to 2003, it did not ascertain 
what the regime did with the kickback money it received; some evidence 
suggested that the kickbacks were used by government ministries for legitimate 
costs.  The Program did not permit Iraq to recover the costs of internal transport 
of goods shipped to Iraq, such as the substantial costs of trucking hundreds of 
tons of imported Australian wheat to the main population center in Baghdad from 
Iraq’s Persian Gulf port of Umm Qasr.  After the Security Council did not act on 
Iraq’s request for internal transport cost reimbursement, Iraq began covertly 
charging its sellers for “transport costs” which were not authorized under the 
Security Council sanctions rules.  MEYER & CALIFANO, supra note 55, at 109–130. 
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fifty states of the United States.  In Commerce Clause cases, the 
validity of federal law ordinarily turns on Congress’s authority 
under the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause to regulate 
commerce between the states.116  Similar to the grounds for 
invoking international effects jurisdiction, the Commerce Clause 
debate often turns on whether an activity subject to federal 
regulation is deemed to have a “substantial effect” on commerce 
between the U.S. states.117  With few exceptions, U.S. courts have 
validated Congress’s regulatory authority, often on the basis of 
highly attenuated claims of a “substantial effect” on commerce in 
cases involving no apparent connection to interstate commercial 
activity.  For some cases that involve purely intrastate conduct 
(e.g., growing wheat or marijuana for one’s own consumption at 
home), the courts have reasoned that if the activity is “economic” 
in nature, its intrastate regulation may be derivatively necessary to 
a broader scheme of interstate market regulation.118 
In harder cases where a court cannot plausibly label the activity 
as economic or commercial in nature, the inquiry shifts to whether 
any other related objects or events have ties to interstate commerce.  
For example, Congress prohibits a felon from possessing a gun if 
the gun has ever previously crossed a state line, even if it did so 
without the felon’s involvement and by lawful shipment by 
someone else that occurred many years before the felon’s later 
 
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
117 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (setting forth the 
“substantial effect” test for interstate commerce). 
118 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (rejecting as-applied 
challenge to federal law prohibiting manufacture, distribution, or possession of 
marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana for medicinal purposes; 
“[w]hen Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a 
national market, it may regulate the entire class.”) (internal quotations omitted); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (rejecting farmer’s as-applied challenge to 
federal law prohibiting growing of wheat on farm for subsistence consumption); 
see also Maxwell L. Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical 
Perspective, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2007) (summarizing evolution of case law 
and extension of Commerce Clause authority to regulate any part of a “class” of 
economic activity that in turn has an effect on interstate commerce); see also Robert 
A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 257–58 
(2005) (suggesting that in dealing with the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court 
has relied on “some concept of ‘commercial activity’ to define the boundary” 
between federal and state authority and that “[t]he national government may 
regulate commercial activity, but has much less ability to regulate noncommercial 
activity,” even though “the distinction between commercial and noncommercial 
activity is difficult to define and employ”). 
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possession of the gun.119  Similarly, Congress prohibits purely 
intrastate possession or production of child pornography, not 
because of any link between this inside-the-home activity and 
interstate commerce but because generic precursor materials, like a 
digital camera or blank photo paper, have previously crossed a 
state line.120 
And if it is not possible to tie any aspect of the regulated 
activity to interstate commerce, then in bootstrap fashion courts are 
prone to shift the inquiry again to whether the regulation itself (not 
the regulated activity) somehow affects interstate commerce.  So, 
 
119 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006); see Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 568–
70 (1977) (affirming felon-in-possession conviction on basis of interstate travel of 
firearm at some point in time possibly several years or more before the 
defendant’s possession and despite lack of any connection between the felon’s 
possession and the firearm’s crossing of a state line); United States v. Patton, 451 
F.3d 615, 634–35 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the continued validity of 
Scarborough in light of Lopez and more recent Commerce Clause cases and 
affirming conviction for intrastate possession by felon of bulletproof vest on the 
basis of evidence that the vest a felon bought in Kansas had been manufactured in 
California). 
120 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2006) (describing federal criminal prohibition of  the 
use of minors for the production of visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct 
“if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have 
been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce by any means, including by computer”); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) 
(2006) (describing the federal criminal prohibition of possession of “any book, 
magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that 
contains an image of child pornography . . .  that was produced using materials 
that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce by any means, including by computer”); see, e.g., United States 
v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823–24 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding a “substantial effect” on 
interstate commerce from intrastate production of child pornography where 
shown that an Olympus camera manufactured in Indonesia was used by  the 
defendant to take pornographic photos); United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 
1282 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that although “the Government did not attempt to 
demonstrate that the images either traveled in interstate commerce themselves or 
were produced with the intent that they would travel in interstate commerce,” 
proof of interstate commerce was sufficient on basis of “evidence that some of the 
photographs were printed on Kodak paper that the developer in Florida received 
from New York and that some of the pictures were processed using equipment 
received from California and manufactured in Japan”); see also United States v. 
Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1178–79 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that the defendant’s purely 
intrastate acts of promoting prostitution had “substantial effect” on interstate 
commerce; “even though his actions occurred solely in Florida, [they] had the 
capacity when considered in the aggregate with similar conduct by others, to 
frustrate Congress’s broader regulation of interstate and foreign economic 
activity,” and his “use of hotels that served interstate travelers and distribution of 
condoms that traveled in interstate commerce are further evidence that [his] 
conduct substantially affected interstate commerce”). 
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for example, federal appeals courts have upheld application of the 
Endangered Species Act to protect small pockets of rare, non-
migratory animals from real estate development, not on the theory 
that destruction of the animals’ habitat possibly affects interstate 
commerce but that the federal regulation of real estate 
development affects interstate commerce.121  On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court has occasionally declined in recent years to find a 
basis in the Commerce Clause for some federal laws, as in United 
States v. Lopez in 1995 when it concluded that a federal law 
regulating the possession of firearms near schools did not have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.122 
The differences in these cases are not explained by factual 
divergence, but, as Robert Schapiro and William Buzbee have 
noted, by the analytic lens through which courts choose to 
scrutinize the “substantial effect” requirement in these cases.123  
Courts sometimes look broadly at the “commercial effects of 
legislation, the commercial implications of an underlying 
problem,” or the “commercial nature of the regulatory target.”124  
Other times courts take a narrower, “unidimensional” view to 
 
121 Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting as-applied Commerce Clause challenge to application of Endangered 
Species Act to real estate development affecting “arroyo southwestern toad,” a 
species that lives only in California and does not have commercial use or value, 
and noting that “the regulation of commercial land development, quite ‘apart 
from the characteristics or range of the specific endangered species involved, has a 
plain and substantial effect on interstate commerce’”); id., reh’g en banc denied, 334 
F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (contending that “[t]he panel’s opinion in effect asks whether the 
challenged regulation substantially affects interstate commerce, rather than 
whether the activity being regulated does so. Thus, the panel sustains the 
application of the Act in this case because Rancho Viejo’s commercial 
development constitutes interstate commerce and the regulation impinges on that 
development, not because the incidental taking of arroyo toads can be said to be 
interstate commerce”); see also Nat’l Assn. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 
1041, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting as-applied Commerce Clause challenge to 
application of Endangered Species Act to block real estate development affecting 
the “Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly,” an insect that was found only in California 
and of no economic use or value).  
122 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; see also United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil remedy provision of Violence Against 
Women Act authorizing federal lawsuits to recover for acts of gender-motivated 
violence). 
123 Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power 
and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1202 
(2003). 
124 Id. at 1203, 1267. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss3/5
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consider only “the economic nature of the regulated activity.”125  In 
Lopez, for example, the Court chose to restrictively focus on the 
economic nature of the regulated activity (possession of guns near 
schools), and thereby concluded that the regulation was not 
authorized under the Commerce Clause.  The Court could just as 
well “have focused on the business aspects of education, the 
business of guns or even illegal guns, defendant Lopez’s plan to 
sell a gun in the school, or the many ripple effects of school quality 
and safety on economic vitality.”126 
The point of this Commerce Clause discussion is not to prefer 
one approach or interpretation over another, but to illustrate the 
constant contestability of a standard such as the “substantial 
effects” test and similar jurisdictional concepts that depend on 
some cross-jurisdictional showing of harm.  Yet because the 
Commerce Clause debate occurs within the framework of U.S. 
domestic law, it is susceptible to definitive—even if unprincipled—
resolution by U.S. courts.  By contrast, any debate under 
international law about the prescriptive jurisdictional basis for a 
U.S. sanction measure is not ordinarily amenable to definitive 
judicial resolution.  No court or arbiter stands ready to pass 
judgment on the legal validity of U.S. sanction measures, at least so 
far as such measures are claimed to exceed the bounds of the U.S. 
sovereign jurisdictional authority.  When the United States justifies 
secondary sanctions on the basis of claimed effects on the interests 
of the United States, opposing parties can easily raise legality 
objections that will remain unresolved and that will add to the 
weight of other political and economic objections resulting from 
these parties’ loss of business or other economic activity with the 
United States.  For U.S. policymakers, this places a premium on 
relying—if feasible—on jurisdictional grounds for secondary 
sanctions that are not as vulnerable to claims of illegality. 
Consider the implication of concluding that the United States 
may not enact any form of secondary sanctions that adversely 
affects the business interests of a foreign company such as Nestlé.  
This would mean that the United States would not only be 
foreclosed from penalizing Nestlé but also legally compelled—for 
lack of prescriptive jurisdiction—to permit its own citizens and 
companies to carry on business with Nestlé as if Nestlé had no 
 
125 Id. at 1223. 
126 Id. at 1259 (internal footnote omitted). 
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involvement at all with a nuclear rogue regime.  Some would 
approve of this result, concluding that no proper grounds for 
prescriptive jurisdiction apply.  The sale of chocolate from Nestlé 
to Iran does not take place in the United States.  It does not involve 
U.S. nationals.  It does not threaten the security of the United States 
or cause any substantial effect inside the United States.  Universal 
jurisdiction does not prohibit even the possession of nuclear 
weapons,127 much less the sale by third parties of chocolate to 
nuclear-armed regimes. 
Fair enough—let us assume here that a lack of prescriptive 
jurisdiction would bar the United States from “regulating” Nestle.  
The United States could not forbid Nestlé from selling chocolate to 
Iran, much less exact a penalty directly against Nestlé for doing so 
(such as jailing Nestlé executives or forfeiting Nestlé’s assets).  The 
more difficult question, however, is whether the lack of jurisdiction 
to regulate Nestlé means the United States also loses power to 
regulate its own citizens and companies in a manner that adversely 
affects Nestlé. 
Suppose, for example, that the United States were to prohibit 
any U.S. company from promoting or facilitating a financial or 
trade transaction with Nestlé within U.S. territory.  This regulation 
would be terrinational-based exclusively on both territoriality and 
nationality grounds.  In contrast to protective or effects 
jurisdiction, territoriality and nationality are generally 
acknowledged, individually, as the two strongest predicates for the 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, based as they are on a 
sovereign’s prerogative to control its own territory and its 
nationals wherever they may be located worldwide.128  Here, in 
referring to “territoriality,” I use the term solely in its core sense to 
refer to the control of conduct within a state’s territory, as distinct 
from the “effects” branch of territoriality—the control of conduct 
that takes place outside a state’s territory and that is intended to 
cause or causes a substantial effect within a state’s territory.  When 
both core territoriality and nationality grounds for jurisdiction 
 
127 Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 266 (July 8, 1996) (declining to find use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons categorically in violation of international law). 
128 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW ch. 1, subch. A, intro. 
(1987) (noting the historical acceptance that “a state had jurisdiction to exercise its 
authority within its territory and with respect to its nationals abroad” and that 
“[t]erritoriality and nationality remain the principal bases of jurisdiction to 
prescribe. . . .”). 
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2009] SECONDARY SANCTIONS 947 
exist simultaneously, it is difficult to conceive of any circumstances 
in which a nation-state’s assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction over 
an actor would be unreasonable.129 
Critics might object to terrinationality as a defining principle on 
the ground that there is no reason to require both territoriality and 
nationality jurisdiction.  But when one state’s jurisdiction rests on 
only one of these grounds (e.g., territoriality), yet another state is 
likely to have jurisdiction on the other ground (e.g., nationality).  A 
given measure becomes more vulnerable to challenge as 
unreasonable when another nation has a competing regulatory 
interest based either on territoriality or nationality.  (A prime 
example is the dispute engendered when the United States extends 
its sanctions regulations to foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of 
U.S. companies.)  The dual predication of terrinational sanctions 
can allow the United States to leverage the impact of primary 
sanctions while minimizing claims that they are jurisdictionally 
illegal. 
The conventional view rejects the notion that a sanction 
measure aimed at extraterritorial conduct can be legitimized by 
being couched in terms of a sanctioning state’s exercise of its 
territorial or nationality jurisdiction.130  This jurisdictional issue 
 
129 The Restatement notes that “[i]nternational law recognizes links of 
territoriality . . . and nationality . . . as generally justifying the exercise of 
jurisdiction to prescribe,” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 
cmt. a. (1987). It further notes that “[i] n some situations the existence of both links 
may be important to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.”  Id., cmt. b.  
Although this statement stops short of declaring a combined basis of territoriality 
and nationality as per se reasonable, this could be because the Restatement 
considers “territorial” jurisdiction in its broadest sense to include not just 
jurisdiction over acts or status in a state’s territory but also jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial acts that have a substantial effect on a state.  The Restatement 
elsewhere suggests that the “effects” prong of territorial jurisdiction is a weaker 
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction than a nation’s interest in controlling in-
territory conduct.  Id. § 403 note 3 (“Where regulation of transnational activity is 
based on its effects in the territory of the regulating state, the principle of 
reasonableness calls for limiting the exercise of jurisdiction so as to minimize 
conflict with the jurisdiction of other states, particularly with the state where the 
act takes place.”). 
130 See, e.g., Busby, supra note 92, at 649 (rejecting “bootstrapping” arguments 
that Helms-Burton Act’s penalties could be based on territorial jurisdiction, 
because they “confuse the triggering conduct that causes the United States to 
exercise jurisdiction within its territory with the actual exercise of that 
jurisdiction”). 
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lurked in the well-known Tuna/Dolphin cases131 and later 
Shrimp/Turtle litigation before international trade dispute 
panels.132  These cases involved successive challenges to U.S. 
import bans against tuna and shrimp that were caught abroad 
without foreign fishermen’s use of procedures to minimize the 
incidental killing of dolphins and turtles.  The litigation gave rise 
to a prominent debate about “product” versus “process”—whether 
trade law permits a country to restrict imports not only on the 
basis of concerns about physical defects or unsafe qualities of the 
“product,” but also on the basis of objections to the “process” that 
was used to generate the product, even if the process has no 
discernible effect on the safety or physical characteristics of the 
product.133 
 
131 Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS21/R-
39S/155 (circulated Sept. 3, 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991); Panel Report, 
United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 6-1, WT/DS29/R (June 16, 1994), 
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994); see also World Trade Organization, Mexico etc 
versus US: ‘tuna-dolphin,’ http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e 
/edis04_e.htm (summarizing tuna-dolphin dispute and unadopted decisions of 
two GATT panels in response to challenges by Mexico and the European Union) 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009).  At the time of the panel decisions, the U.S. Marine 
Mammal Protection Act prohibited the importation of yellow fin tuna harvested 
by purse seine methods unless the exporting nation provided evidence that it had 
adopted a regulatory program governing the incidental taking of marine 
mammals comparable to that of the United States and that, among other 
requirements, the average rate of taking of marine mammals was not more than 
1.25 times the rate of taking of marine mammals by U.S. vessels. See 16 U.S.C. § 
1361 (1988) historical and statutory note (citing Pub. L. No. 100-711, § 4(a) and 
Pub. L.  No. 105-42, § 4(b)(1)).  The Act was amended in 1997 to remove the 
statutory numerical limits and to require proof instead of compliance with 
safeguards of the International Dolphin Conservation Program. 16 U.S.C. § 
1361(a)(2) (2006); see also Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 
2007) (summarizing dolphin-safe legislation); Defenders of Wildlife v. Hogarth, 
177 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1339–41 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (summarizing disposition of 
GATT challenges and changes to statutory scheme). 
132 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998); Appellate Body Report, 
United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); see also 
World Trade Organization, India etc versus US: ‘shrimp-turtle,’ 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2009) (summarizing shrimp-turtle dispute in India and Mexico); World Trade 
Organization, Mexico etc versus US: ‘tuna-dolphin,’ http://www.wto.org/english 
/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). 
133 Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540–48 
(2004) (noting that “the process/product distinction . . . has become a subject of 
intense debate among member nations of the WTO” and reviewing tuna/dolphin 
and shrimp/turtle decisions). 
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Although the Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle cases 
principally involved complex interpretations of specific provisions 
of the GATT,134 these issues were analyzed, in part, in light of 
notions about whether it was jurisdictionally permissible for the 
United States to condition the entry of imports on the 
extraterritorial conduct of foreign countries with United States-
dictated environmental protections.135  Indeed, as Joel Trachtman 
suggests, “it can be argued that all WTO cases are concerned with 
allocation of regulatory authority” and, for example, that “[a]t the 
core of the Shrimp case is the jurisdictional question:  can the 
United States regulate the way in which Indian, Malaysian, 
Pakistani, and Thai fishermen fish for shrimp, as a condition for 
access to U.S. markets?”136 
The academic commentary is divided about the jurisdictional 
justification for a trade ban of the type at issue in the 
Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle cases.  On the one hand, Sarah 
Cleveland contends that a trade ban is justified as an exercise of 
territorial jurisdiction.  She notes that “under classical jurisdictional 
analysis, a measure conditioning bilateral trade on conduct 
occurring in the other state, such as that in Shrimp/Turtle I, is not 
truly ‘extraterritorial,’” because “[t]rade with a foreign state by 
definition has a territorial nexus with the sanctioning state, and can 
be regulated by it.”137  She adds that “[n]othing in customary 
international law bars a state from conditioning access to its own 
 
134 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.  The GATT imposes obligations of most-favored-nation 
treatment (Article I), national treatment (Article III), and elimination of 
quantitative restrictions (Article XI).  Id. art. XI.  In addition, Article XX of the 
GATT lists numerous exceptions to these usual rules of free trade, such as for 
unilateral restrictive measures “necessary to protect public morals,” (Art. XX(a)), 
or “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” (Art. XX(b)), or 
“relating to the products of prison labour” (Art. XX(e)), or “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources” (Art. XX(g)).  Id. at art. XX.  Article 
XXI of the GATT also justifies measures taken for national security reasons.  Id. 
art. XXI.  For a general description of these GATT provisions as they may apply to 
trade-related sanctions measures, see Charnovitz, supra note 7, at 694, and 
Vázquez, supra note 7, at 809–10. 
135 See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
DS21/R-39S/155, supra note 131, ¶ 5.28. (noting that “even if Article XX(b) were 
interpreted to permit extrajurisdictional protection of life and health, [it] would 
not meet the requirement of necessity set out in that provision”). 
136 Trachtman, supra note 8, at 633–34. 
137 Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions, supra note 7, at 160. 
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markets in this manner.”138  This argument, however, assumes the 
presence of a territorial link to be conclusive of a state’s right to 
assert jurisdiction without accounting for the further—although 
disputable—requirement that an exercise of territorial jurisdiction 
be “reasonable” to be sustained as valid under international 
jurisdictional law.139 
On the other hand, Carlos Manuel Vázquez has suggested that 
the import ban at issue in the Tuna/Dolphin case was an improper 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction that could not be justified on 
grounds that it technically regulated only conduct within the 
United States: “Given that the whole point of the import ban is to 
induce a change in the production process [occurring abroad], it 
makes considerable sense to view the U.S. law as an attempt to 
regulate conduct taking place in another country, and the denial of 
access to the U.S. market as the enforcement mechanism.”140  
Vázquez reasons that if an import ban could be justified on the 
basis of territoriality (because it nominally controls conduct only 
within U.S. territory), then “no law would violate limits on 
prescriptive jurisdiction,” because “every law could simply be 
recharacterize[d] as a regulation of access to the regulating state’s 
territory.”141  He adds that “[t]he very existence of international 
law limits on prescriptive jurisdiction separate and apart from 
international law limits on adjudicatory and enforcement 
jurisdiction shows that concerns about extraterritoriality cannot be 
made to disappear through such a sleight of hand.”142 
A difficulty with Vázquez’s argument is that it does not 
account for an essential distinction between terrinational 
jurisdiction and other grounds of prescriptive jurisdiction.  When 
jurisdiction rests on grounds other than territoriality or nationality 
(such as protective, effects, or universal jurisdiction), then its 
validity turns on some external, substantive aspect of the reason for 
regulation.  For example, if the United States criminalizes the 
counterfeiting of its currency anywhere in the world (which the 
 
138 Id. 
139 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987) 
(establishing the framework of “reasonableness” under international law). 
Application of the “reasonableness” requirement in the context of terrinational 
sanctions is discussed in greater detail below. 
140 Vázquez, supra note 7, at 813. 
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Restatement suggests it could do as a permissible exercise of 
protective jurisdiction), then the jurisdictional legitimacy of this 
regulation when applied, for example, to a currency printing press 
in North Korea depends on the existence of a link between the 
counterfeiting conduct and some adverse effect or threat to the 
security of the United States.143 
By contrast, both territorial and nationality grounds for 
jurisdiction are status-based (location and citizenship) and 
substance-neutral.  They need not be justified by reference to any 
purpose, content, or effect of the conduct sought to be regulated.  
They rest solely on recognition of a nation-state’s sovereign 
authority to control for any purpose what its own nationals do 
within its own territory.  Indeed, a “nation-state” as a concept is 
defined principally by reference to a governmental entity’s control 
over territory and a permanent population of people.144  
Sovereignty presupposes at the least each nation-state’s power to 
control what its own citizens do on its own lands and without a 
burden to justify the fact of its exercise of this power to other 
sovereigns. 
This is not to say that the United States need never justify to 
other countries how it regulates its own nationals on its own 
territory.  It is to claim only that the United States need not justify 
its jurisdictional authority to do so.  Its jurisdictional authority to 
promulgate a rule is distinct from whether the rule puts the United 
States in violation of a substantive obligation to other nation-states 
under treaty or customary international law.  Suppose, for 
example, that the United States ordered its citizens to burn 
chemical waste along the Canadian border, knowing full well that 
toxic pollutants would rain on Canada.  The argument against this 
law would be that it violates substantive international law 
 
143 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. f (1987) 
(noting application of “protective principle” to counterfeiting conduct). 
144 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987) (“Under 
international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent 
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has 
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”).  See also 
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (noting that “[t]he prerogative of a nation to control and regulate activities 
within its boundaries is an essential, definitional element of sovereignty,” that 
“[e]very country has a right to dictate laws governing the conduct of its 
inhabitants,” and that “the territoriality base of jurisdiction is universally 
recognized” and “is the most pervasive and basic principle underlying the 
exercise by nations of prescriptive regulatory power”). 
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agreements against transboundary pollution,145 not that the United 
States lacks jurisdiction in the first instance to decide what U.S. 
citizens may do on U.S. land. 
To be sure, it could be asserted that an exercise of territorial or 
nationality jurisdiction must be reasonable.146  But the 
reasonableness-of-jurisdiction inquiry cannot be a substitute for the 
substantive merits or demerits of a particular regulation.  Its focus 
should be the strength of competing states’ interest in the authority 
to decide the prescriptive rule for a given category of activity, apart 
from whether specific conduct implicates a substantive 
international law commitment.  If it were otherwise, then 
international jurisdictional principles would be no more than a 
backdoor means for a nation to challenge innumerable regulations 
of other nation-states as “unreasonable,” even in the absence of any 
violation of a substantive treaty commitment or other substantive 
conduct principle of customary international law. 
As noted above, Vázquez suggests that an extraterritorially-
aimed sanction that is restricted to the control of in-territory 
conduct (such as a U.S. ban on imports of non-dolphin-safe tuna) 
should be viewed as an “enforcement mechanism” for an 
extraterritorial prescriptive rule.  True enough, the labeling of a 
sanctions measure as “enforcement” rather than “prescriptive” 
may be of great significance to deciding its jurisdictional validity.  
Suppose, for example, that terrorists bomb Spain and that in 
response the U.S. President issues an executive order requiring 
U.S. banks to freeze any U.S. assets of persons and entities who 
may later be deemed responsible for the bombing.  If the 
President’s bank-freeze order is characterized as an exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction, then its validity would turn in part on 
whether the United States has prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate 
the underlying conduct (a bombing) that occurred in Spain.  The 
answer might not be obvious.  If the bombing did not involve U.S. 
nationals as perpetrators or victims, then the basis for prescriptive 
 
145 See, e.g., Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 
13, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1442 (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983) (demanding that the 
parties minimize discharge of air pollutants across domestic borders); Agreement 
on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 676 (entered into force Mar. 13, 
1991).  
146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987) 
(reasonableness requirement applicable to grounds for jurisdiction identified in 
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jurisdiction could depend on protective or effects jurisdiction to 
look at whether the bombing threatened or caused a substantial 
effect in the United States.  This may depend in part on whether 
the bombers belong to a global organization such as Al Qaeda, 
rather than local Basque separatists who have no apparent designs 
to attack the United States.  Or there may possibly be universal 
jurisdiction because of the tie to terrorism (although as Curtis 
Bradley notes “the degree to which universal jurisdiction applies to 
acts of terrorism is still contested and uncertain”).147 
By contrast, if the President’s bank-freeze order is viewed as an 
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction to govern the conduct of U.S. 
banks, then the analysis and basis for jurisdiction is clear.  The 
President’s asset-freeze order regulates the conduct of U.S. national 
entities (banks) concerning property in the United States (money).  
It is a proper exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction on terrinationality 
grounds. 
In short, if a U.S. sanctions law is viewed as an exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction, then its validity depends on whether the 
United States has prescriptive jurisdiction over the underlying 
conduct that has prompted the responsive “enforcement” measure.  
On the other hand, if a sanctions law is deemed in the first instance 
to be of a prescriptive jurisdictional stature, then its validity turns 
on traditional prescriptive criteria, such as whether it regulates the 
conduct of U.S. nationals or others within U.S. territory.  The more 
a sanctions law is “prescriptive” rather than “enforcement,” the 
stronger its claim to jurisdictional validity if conditioned on the 
occurrence of acts occurring abroad. 
Although the Restatement does not resolve the issue, its 
commentary casually references sanctions as if they were no more 
than an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction.  In the course of 
discussing the scope of enforcement jurisdiction, the Restatement 
cites examples of economic sanctions such as denial of import 
licenses, debarment from bidding on government contracts, and 
blocking of assets.148  Moreover, the Restatement’s commentary 
 
147 Bradley, supra note 93, at 329. 
148 The Restatement’s commentary provides that: 
enforcement measure[s] comprise . . . [options] such as the following, 
when used to induce compliance with or as sanctions for violation of 
laws or regulations of the enforcing state: 
—denial of the right to engage in export or import transactions; 
—removal from a list of persons eligible to bid on government 
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also goes as far to suggest that a secondary sanctions measure 
prohibiting a U.S. company from trading with a third-country 
company that does business with a target of U.S. sanctions would 
be invalid for lack of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction over trade 
between the third-country and country X.149  This example 
implicitly assumes a secondary sanctions measure to be an exercise 
of enforcement jurisdiction and dependent on the existence of 
prescriptive jurisdiction for the United States to regulate trade 
between the neutral and target countries. 
Most sanctions laws, however, are not properly characterized 
as mere enforcement measures.  When the United States authorizes 
sanctions, it regulates conduct in the same manner as it does for 
other acts within its prescriptive jurisdiction.  Just as a criminal 
law—which is a quintessential prescriptive measure—may outlaw 
terrorism and authorize imprisonment for terrorists, so too a 
sanctions law may prescriptively require banks to freeze terrorist 
bank accounts and authorize penalties against banks that fail to 
comply.  Both measures not only prescribe conduct but also specify 
consequences for failure to comply.  Neither law involves actual 
enforcement against any particular entity or individual.  Of course, 
when either a criminal law or sanctions measure is subsequently 
applied to a particular individual or entity (such as by jailing an 
individual or denying an export license), this is an exercise of 
enforcement pursuant to the prescriptive norm.  But the fact of 
enforcement in the particular does not dispel the prescriptive 
 
contracts; 
—suspension, revocation, or denial of a permit to engage in particular 
business activity; 
—prohibition of the transfer of assets; and 
—comparable denial of opportunities normally open to the person 
against whom enforcement is directed.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 431 cmt. c (1987). 
149 “For example, it might be reasonable for the United States to deny to a 
foreign company export privileges, i.e., the right to participate in transactions 
involving export of United States goods, because the company had knowingly 
reexported a strategic product of United States origin to country X in violation of 
United States law. . . .  It normally would be unreasonable for the United States to 
deny such export privileges to the same firm simply because it traded with 
country X in goods not of United States origin, since ordinarily the United States 
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character of either the underlying criminal or sanctions-
authorizing law.150 
As these examples suggest, a criminal law might “regulate” 
terrorists, just as a sanctions law such as an asset freeze may 
“regulate” the conduct of banks, albeit the sanctions law may be 
intended also to impose adverse effects on foreign terrorists whose 
funds will be frozen.  A bank that chooses to flout the sanctions 
law is subject to penalty, just as a person who breaks the criminal 
law against terrorism.  But a question remains: does the fact that 
the sanctions law is laden with an ulterior intent to impose a cost 
on foreign terrorists or other foreign actors mean that it should be 
viewed as an invalid regulation of extraterritorial conduct, rather 
than a valid territorial regulation of U.S. banks?  The answer is 
“no” for several reasons. 
First, consider whether solely the fact of an adverse economic 
effect on foreign actors is enough to raise a question about a 
sanctions law’s jurisdictional validity (apart from any intent or 
purpose of the measure to cause this effect).  An adverse effect 
alone is not enough to invalidate a secondary sanctions measure, 
because economic harm to extraterritorial parties is a likely 
consequence even of primary sanctions measures.  For example, 
whenever the United States imposes primary unilateral sanctions 
to prohibit U.S. companies from trading directly with a target 
regime, it foreseeably disadvantages non-U.S. companies who 
assisted U.S. companies to furnish goods or services to the 
sanctions target. 
Suppose, for example, that U.S. law bars General Electric from 
selling aircraft engines to the Sudan and that General Electric 
builds its engines using many parts supplied from China.151  A U.S. 
 
150 This distinction between application to a particular case and general 
promulgation of a sanctions rule may well explain why the Restatement’s 
commentary discusses sanctions measures as if they were matters of enforcement 
jurisdiction. See id. § 431 cmt. c. 
151 Headquartered in the United States, the General Electric Company is the 
world’s leading producer of large and small jet engines for commercial and 
military aircraft. General Electric, About GE—Aviation, http:// 
www.geaviation.com/aboutgeae/index.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); General 
Electric website, Investor Contacts, http://www.ge.com/investors 
/investor_contacts.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009); see also Masumi Suga & 
Stephen Engle, GE to Double Purchases of Jet-Engine Parts from India, China, 
BLOOMBERG.COM NEWS, July 6, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com 
/pps/news?pid=20601091&sid=aaLumJ7463Fg&refer=india (last visited Feb. 28, 
2009) (noting that GE “last year decided to target $10 billion of purchases from 
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sanctions measure restricting GE will surely mean a loss of 
business for Chinese component parts suppliers.  Still, this 
economic disadvantage does not mean that the United States has 
exceeded its prescriptive jurisdictional bounds and “regulated” 
Chinese companies.  When a nation-state confines its power to 
regulate terrinationally, it cannot be said that such measures are 
impermissibly extraterritorial simply because of their adverse 
effect on persons abroad. 
Nor does it matter that a terrinational sanctions law is triggered 
by or premised on conduct occurring abroad.152  Consider, for 
example, a secondary sanctions law prohibiting U.S. companies 
from trading with Chinese companies that in turn do business with 
the government of Sudan.  This measure would be no different 
from other kinds of “nested” or contingent prescriptive conduct 
prohibitions that impose a penalty on a domestic actor for 
participating in a transaction relating to activity occurring outside 
the territory of the regulating authority.  For example, federal law 
and many states of the United States criminalize knowing receipt 
or trafficking in stolen property.153  It does not matter if the 
property may have been stolen abroad or outside the state (and 
presumably beyond the ability of the United States or an 
individual state to prescribe conduct).154  Similarly, federal money 
 
China” and that “[m]any low-technology structural engine components are 
produced in Asia”). 
152 But see Busby, supra note 92, at 649 (rejecting territoriality as potential 
jurisdictional basis for Helms-Burton Act because this “confuse[s] the triggering 
conduct that causes the United States to exercise jurisdiction within its territory 
with the actual exercise of that jurisdiction”). 
153 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2006) (prohibiting receipt of property of more 
than $5,000 value that has crossed a state or U.S. boundary after being stolen); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(a) (2004) (criminalizing receipt of stolen goods); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 2C:20-7(a) (West 2006) (same); OH. REV. CODE § 2913.51 (2004) (West same); 
VA. CODE. § 18.2-108 (West 2004) (same). 
154 See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003) (receipt in the 
United States of property stolen in Egypt); United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247, 
251 (2d Cir. 1962) (receipt in New York of bonds stolen in Canada); State v. 
Freitag, 247 P.2d 502 (Kan. 1990) (holding that a Kansas court had jurisdiction to 
try the theft charge, even though the theft occurred in Missouri because the 
property was recovered in Kansas); Brown v. State, 281 So. 2d 924, 925 (Miss. 
1973) (holding that the fact that goods were stolen out of state does not defeat 
criminal liability for receipt of stolen property); Commonwealth v. White, 265 
N.E.2d 473, 474 (Mass. 1970) (allowing criminal liability in Massachusetts after a 
car stolen in Canada was brought into Massachusetts); Cockrell v. Page, 431 P.2d 
668, 669 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967) (finding that an Oklahoma court had jurisdiction 
over a defendant who brought chattel stolen from Texas to Oklahoma). 
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laundering law prohibits knowingly transacting in money or 
property that the defendant knows to be proceeds of unlawful 
activity, even from unlawful activity occurring abroad.155  It does 
not matter that the antecedent unlawful activity occurred abroad 
because the relevant conduct subject to regulation is the 
subsequent laundering transaction in the United States.156 
In neither type of case involving receipt of extraterritorially 
stolen property or laundering of foreign crime proceeds is there a 
sustainable claim that the United States has impermissibly 
legislated on the basis of events occurring abroad.  For the same 
reason, the fact that the United States may lack a proper 
prescriptive jurisdictional basis to regulate business deals between 
China and Sudan does not dispel U.S. authority to regulate the 
conduct of U.S. companies in U.S. territory to prohibit them from 
doing business with Sudan’s Chinese business partners. 
This discussion suggests that a key issue is whom a sanctions 
law actually “regulates.”  If a U.S. sanctions law subjects a French 
arms merchant to imprisonment or payment of a civil fine because 
of the merchant’s shipment of arms from France to Iran, then the 
U.S. sanctions law “regulates” the French arms merchant because 
of his exposure at the hands of U.S. government officials with 
penalties for failure to comply.  If, on the other hand, a U.S. 
sanctions law prohibits U.S. companies in the United States from 
doing business with a French arms merchant that trades with Iran, 
then it cannot be said that the U.S. law regulates the French 
merchant at all.  The U.S. law may disadvantage the merchant, 
perhaps severely so in hopes of effectuating a change by the French 
company in its business conduct.  But the law still does not 
regulate the French merchant, as he faces no consequences at the 
hands of the U.S. government for failure to conform.  The French 
merchant faces consequences incident only to the U.S. regulation of 
 
155 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (C)(1) (2006) (noting the illegality of 
conducting a financial transaction with knowledge that it involves “proceeds of 
some form of unlawful activity” if the transaction “is designed in whole or in 
part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, 
or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” and defining “some 
form of unlawful activity” to include “a felony under State, Federal, or foreign 
law”). 
156 Id. 
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the conduct of its own citizens that takes place in its own 
territory.157 
It follows that a terrinational sanctions law is not rendered 
invalid simply because it has an adverse effect on foreign actors or 
because its operation is triggered by acts that occur abroad.  But 
these conclusions do not reckon with still perhaps the most potent 
objection:  that such adverse consequences happen on purpose and 
not by accident.  Does the fact that a terrinational secondary 
sanctions law is intended to burden and deter certain extraterritorial 
conduct—such as Europe’s or China’s business dealings with 
Sudan—render the measure unreasonable or otherwise invalid 
under customary international jurisdiction law? 
The answer must be “no” for two reasons.  First, as discussed 
above, even primary sanctions are intended to deter certain 
extraterritorial conduct.  There is no reason to suppose that 
secondary sanctions are categorically and presumptively less valid 
because they share the same extraterritorial intent.  Second, the 
jurisdictional validity of a state’s regulation of its own nationals in 
its own territory does not rest on the state’s purpose, intent, or 
reason for regulation.  Territorial and nationality regulation rest 
solely on the situs of conduct and identity of the actors subject to 
regulation.  The question, then, is not whether a terrinational 
regulation is intended to affect conduct abroad (as it surely is), but 
whether it can be viewed in the first instance as having a legitimate 
domestic purpose to regulate one’s own citizens at home. 
But what qualifies as a legitimate regulable domestic “interest” 
of a state’s citizens?  When can it be said that a regulation 
permissibly regulates the in-country activities of one’s own citizens 
rather than serving as no more than a pretext for control of 
extraterritorial conduct?  One common theory stemming from 
cases such as the Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle disputes relies 
on the so-called “product” versus “process” distinction.  As noted 
above, under this theory a country may permissibly bar imports 
based on unsafe or immoral characteristics inherent to the 
imported product itself (such as poisons or pornography), but it 
may not bar imports merely because of non-quality/non-safety 
 
157 Cedric Ryngaert overlooks this point in contending that “secondary 
boycotts raise serious public international law concerns,” because “[t]hey subject 
corporations that are not incorporated in the boycotting State to the latter’s 
regulations in the absence of a direct and clearly discernable effect on that State.”  
Ryngaert, supra note 92, at 626. 
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objections about the extraterritorial process employed to make the 
product or to get it to the U.S. market (such as the use of child 
labor or non-dolphin-safe fishing methods).158 
Although many commentators endorse the product/process 
distinction, it increasingly has come under attack because it 
undervalues the interests of domestic consumers in declining to 
participate in a tainted production-and-consumption chain.159  As 
Douglas Kysar notes, consumers often care about more than just 
the physical characteristics of the products they consume.  They 
also have “preferences for processes,” that is, “consumer 
preferences may be heavily influenced by information regarding 
the manner in which goods are produced.”160  These concerns “can 
include the labor conditions of workers who produce a consumer 
good, the environmental effects of a good’s production, the use of 
controversial engineering techniques such as genetic modification 
to create a good, or any number of other social, economic, or 
environmental circumstances that are related causally to a 
consumer product, but that do not necessarily manifest themselves 
in the product itself.”161 
In short, as Kysar suggests, “consumers may view 
consumption choices, at least in part, as moral acts that have 
personal significance irrespective of their instrumental effects.”162  
Similarly, as Steve Charnovitz has observed, trade-related 
restrictions may have more than one purpose—they may not only 
be “outwardly-directed” to change conduct abroad but also 
simultaneously “inwardly-directed” in order to “protect morals of 
persons in one’s own country” from association with conduct that 
the governing state abhors.163  Thus, for example, when Congress 
 
158 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental ‘PPMs’ in the WTO: 
Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 59, 64–70 (2002) (describing the 
range of potential trade restrictions based on “process and production methods” 
for imported products).  Although Charnovitz contends that some kinds of PPMs 
are permissible under trade law, he notes that “[m]any commentators contend 
that WTO rules do not permit importing governments to make distinctions based 
on the production process.”  Id. at 76. 
159 Id. 
160 Kysar, supra note 133, at 529. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 532 (emphasis added). 
163 Cf. Charnovitz, supra note 7, at 695. But see Kysar, supra note 133, at 532 
(noting that the distinction between “outwardly directed” and “inwardly 
directed” may be “somewhat arbitrary because there are two sides to a 
transaction” allowing dual characterization). 
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enacted consumer “dolphin-safe” labeling requirements, it 
declared a purpose not only “to support a worldwide ban on high 
seas driftnet fishing” but also to vindicate the interests of 
“consumers [who] would like to know if the tuna they purchase is 
falsely labeled as to the effect of the harvesting of the tuna on 
dolphins.”164 
These “inward” concerns for consumer preference justify 
terrinational sanctions restrictions that effectuate one country’s 
citizens’ interest in not taking part in the chain of production, 
distribution, and consumption that ultimately supports 
reprehensible actors or their conduct.  The concerns hold equally 
true for secondary sanctions as primary sanctions.  Citizens may 
legitimately wish that they and their countrymen not transact 
directly with a genocidal regime or transact with companies that 
choose to do business with a genocidal regime.  Terrinational 
sanctions laws that give collective effect to these preferences are a 
legitimate regulation of a country’s own citizenry regardless of 
their additional intent to discourage harmful or odious conduct 
abroad.  The conventional view of secondary sanctions—with its 
focus on condemning extraterritorial effect and intent—too broadly 
incapacitates a sanctioning state from regulating and protecting the 
interests of its own companies and citizens at home. 
Still, as noted above, even sanctions resting upon territorial and 
nationality grounds may be subject to the general requirement of 
reasonableness.165  With terrinationally-limited sanctions should 
come two principal restrictions that underscore their 
reasonableness and enhance the likelihood that they will be viewed 
by other countries as a legitimate exercise of prescriptive 
jurisdiction.  First, in recognition that terrinational sanctions do not 
“regulate” foreign actors abroad, there should be no penalty or 
threat of enforcement against any non-U.S. person who chooses to 
trade or transact with a U.S. person in violation of the secondary 
sanctions restriction.  U.S. sanctions laws commonly impose 
liability against those who aid-or-abet a sanctions violation.166  For 
 
164 16 U.S.C. §§ 1385(b)(2), (b)(3) (2006). 
165 See supra notes 107–09 and accompanying text. 
166 See International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act, Pub. L. 
No. 110-96, § 206, 121 Stat. 1011 (2007) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2006)) 
(authorizing both civil and criminal penalties against those who violate the act—
which encompasses aiding-and-abetting).  In cases where secondary sanctions are 
not based on terrinationality but on protective or effects jurisdiction as in the case 
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terrinational sanctions regulation, the United States should refrain 
from imposing co-conspirator, accessory, or aiding-and-abetting 
liability on foreign individuals or firms, even if they are allegedly 
complicit in a violation by a U.S. individual or company of a 
terrinational-based sanction.  If GE trades with a Chinese company 
in violation of the sanctions law, only GE should face liability, 
consistent with respect for ensuring that the regulation remains 
domestic in scope. 
Second and more significantly, terrinationality should not 
tautologically extend to the regulatory or enforcement conduct of 
government officials (e.g., police, prosecutors, and prison guards), 
as opposed to the regulation of non-governmental persons in their 
personal and business dealings.  The customary law of 
international jurisdiction principally concerns the authority of 
government through its officials to regulate individuals and other 
sub-national actors, not of governmental officials to regulate 
themselves.  Indeed, if either territorial or nationality principles 
were extended to include the conduct of governmental officials 
and employees, then virtually any form of extraterritorial 
regulation could be justified.  The United States, for example, could 
criminalize prostitution among Peruvians in Peru.  A Peruvian 
pimp on vacation in the United States could be arrested and jailed, 
assertedly on the contention that the U.S. law was not an improper 
regulation of conduct in Peru but of the conduct of arresting and 
prosecuting U.S. officials in U.S. territory.  Indeed, FBI agents 
could raid brothels in Lima, assertedly on the ground of U.S. 
authority to direct and control the actions of its own law 
enforcement nationals.167 
In this vein, Vázquez has good reason to worry about the 
overextension of territorial jurisdiction, such as he fears that “State 
A might enact a law making it a crime for anyone anywhere to spit 
on a sidewalk,” and then State A might invoke territorial 
jurisdiction to subject any foreign sidewalk spitter to arrest upon 
entry into the United States.168  But the limitation that this Article 
 
of third parties who aid-and-abet specific hostile activity of the target regime, then 
accessorial liability would continue to be appropriate. 
167 Of course, the FBI’s raid in Peru would be independently objectionable as 
an in-territory enforcement measure without the consent of Peru. See 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 432(2) (1987) (prohibiting exercise of 
enforcement jurisdiction in foreign country without consent of foreign country). 
168 Vázquez, supra note 7, at 814. 
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suggests—to require a sanctions regulation be directed to non-
governmental officials—would bar terrinational regulation from 
being applied in this manner.  Neither territoriality nor nationality 
jurisdiction would justify State A’s arrest of foreign sidewalk 
spitters upon their entry to State A, because both these grounds for 
jurisdiction as asserted would rest solely on the in-country conduct 
and citizenship of governmental officials, rather than the in-
country conduct of private citizens who are the appropriate 
subjects of regulation. 
This is not to suggest that neither territorial nor nationality 
jurisdiction can extend to a government’s own officials.  Rather, the 
claim is that these grounds for jurisdiction remain subject to an 
overarching reasonableness requirement and that reasonableness is 
established where it is clear that the regulation and its burdens 
apply to and burden the conduct of one’s own citizens, not just 
one’s own governmental officials.  The fact that a law burdens the 
primary conduct of citizens—not just governmental officials—to 
prevent them from engaging in transactions or dealings they might 
otherwise choose is indicative of a regulation’s status as a genuine 
restriction on domestic conduct (regardless of the restriction’s 
additional foreign effects). 
Nor does the sidewalk spitting example suggest that State A—
if genuinely abhorred by the global prevalence of sidewalk 
spitters—would be powerless to act at all.  Rather than subjecting 
to arrest those foreign sidewalk spitters that happened to enter 
State A’s territory, State A could regulate its own private citizenry 
to prohibit them from doing business in State A with foreign 
sidewalk spitters.  Despite the apparent absurdity of State A’s 
concern about sidewalk spitting in other countries, the point 
remains that State A could respond in a terrinationally limited 
manner that would not exceed the jurisdiction of a state to regulate 
its own citizens within its own territory. 
From this distinction between the regulation of governmental 
and non-governmental actors, it follows that Vázquez’s concern 
about the U.S. tuna/dolphin import ban is well-founded.  But it is 
not for the reason Vázquez posits—that the ban was tainted by an 
improper purpose of the United States to influence foreign fishing 
practices.  Instead, it is because the tuna/dolphin import ban did 
not “regulate” anyone in the United States except for governmental 
customs officials charged with denying entry to non-conforming 
tuna.  Because the only “regulation” was of governmental officials, 
the import ban was unreasonable and amounted—as Vázquez 
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asserts—to an invalid “enforcement mechanism” for an 
extraterritorial prescriptive rule. 
So, then, if the United States cannot enact an import ban on 
non-dolphin-safe tuna, is it jurisdictionally powerless to regulate 
domestically its citizenry in a way that affects countries’ tuna 
fishing methods?  No—rather than an import ban, terrinationality 
would allow the United States to regulate the in-territory business 
conduct of U.S. citizens, even in a manner intended to alter foreign 
fishing practices.  For example, the United States could prohibit its 
companies and citizens in the United States from engaging in 
contracts to buy, sell, finance, or transport tuna that were not 
caught using dolphin-safe methods.  This restriction would 
doubtless have a similar effect as an outright trade ban on Mexico 
and other tuna-exporting countries, but it would be independently 
justifiable as a regulation of the conduct of U.S. nationals in U.S. 
territory. 
The distinction is not merely formal.  Regardless of whether 
foreign countries might ever adopt dolphin-safe methods, the 
United States has an independent interest to stop its citizens and 
companies from supporting the killing of dolphins by participating 
in a non-dolphin-safe distribution chain.  Indeed, apart from the 
import ban, the United States has long had labeling legislation to 
inhibit its citizens from purchasing non-dolphin-safe tuna 
(whatever its domestic or foreign source).  Since 1990, U.S. law has 
prohibited the sale in the United States of tuna with a “Dolphin 
Safe” label if the tuna in fact was caught using non-dolphin-safe 
methods.169 
Different nations draw different lines between what conduct is 
“governmental” and what conduct is “non-governmental,” and 
this may pose a challenge in some cases in determining if a 
terrinational sanctions measure should be viewed as a 
government’s regulation of private citizen conduct rather than a 
more questionable regulation of a government’s own officials.  This 
problem, however, is far from novel as U.S. courts have often 
grappled with a similar issue in the context of judging the 
immunity of foreign sovereigns from civil suit in the courts of the 
United States.  By statute, foreign sovereigns are immune from 
 
169 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, Pub. L. No. 101-627, § 901, 
104 Stat. 4436 (1990) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006)); see also Earth Island Inst. 
v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing the U.S. statutory dolphin 
protection scheme). 
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liability in U.S. courts except to the extent they engage in non-
governmental “commercial” activities.170  The Supreme Court has 
noted that, regardless of a government’s public purpose for 
regulation, “when a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a 
market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign 
sovereign’s actions are ‘commercial’” in nature.171  The 
“commercial activity” exception is now widely acknowledged 
worldwide.172  A similar and now generally well-accepted inquiry 
into the nature rather than purpose of activity subject to 
governmental regulation could distinguish between regulation of 
private and governmental actors. 
This distinction between the regulation of “commercial” versus 
“governmental” conduct explains why secondary sanctions are less 
jurisdictionally controvertible when, as with the recent secondary 
sanctions law enacted against Sudan, they take the form of 
procurement debarment or divestment.  Consider, for example, the 
provision of the recent law that prevents U.S. government agencies 
from awarding contracts to companies that do certain kinds of 
business with the government of Sudan.173  This measure restricts 
U.S. nationals within U.S. territory; although its restriction involves 
U.S. governmental actors (rather than private citizens), it regulates 
them in their capacity as de facto private market participants in the 
purchase of goods and services.174  Similarly, the new law’s 
 
170 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–11 (2006)). 
171 Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2006) (“The commercial character of an activity shall be 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular 
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.”). 
172 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunity of States and 
Their Property, Dec. 2, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 803 (not yet entered into force). The U.N. 
Convention provides that the nature (not purpose) of a transaction should be the 
primary factor governing whether an act is commercial, but suggests that purpose 
may be considered if the parties to the transaction have agreed or if purpose is 
relevant in the practice of the forum state. Id. art. 2(2); see also David P. Stewart, 
The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 194, 194 (2005) (noting that the U.N. convention “embraces the so-called 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, under which governments are subject to 
essentially the same jurisdictional rules as private entities in respect of their 
commercial transactions”). 
173 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
174 See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614–15 (noting that “a foreign government’s 
issuance of regulations limiting foreign currency exchange is a sovereign activity, 
because such authoritative control of commerce cannot be exercised by a private 
party; whereas a contract to buy army boots or even bullets is a ‘commercial’ 
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authorization of state and local governments to divest their assets 
from companies that do certain kinds of business in Sudan 
involves the regulation of the private market activities of 
governmental actors.  Although these debarment and divestment 
measures may not be clearly justifiable as an exercise of protective 
or universal jurisdiction, they are plainly appropriate exercises of 
terrinational jurisdiction. 
By contrast, the Helms-Burton Act’s civil liability provision 
cannot be squared with terrinationality, even though it regulates 
on its face the conduct of private market actors who wish to bring 
treble-damages suits against “traffickers” in Cuban-expropriated 
property.  In reality, the law conscripts and empowers U.S. 
governmental judicial officials to award and enforce damages 
against foreign persons and companies.  This is no different than 
authorizing government officials at a private person’s behest to 
seize and forfeit assets of foreign companies that have done 
business involving Cuban-expropriated property.  Although 
nominally predicable on territorial and nationality grounds, the 
Helms-Burton civil liability provision does not meet the test for 
terrinational sanctions because it does not constitute legitimate 
regulation of private conduct on terrinational grounds. 
But this conclusion does not mean that the United States is 
jurisdictionally powerless to deter foreign companies from 
“trafficking” in Cuban-expropriated property.  Terrinationality 
would allow a law forbidding U.S. citizens in U.S. territory from 
doing business with “blacklisted” foreign companies that are 
known to profit from Cuban-expropriated property.  
Terrinationality would also allow a law requiring U.S. banks to 
cease all business with traffickers, including the immediate 
freezing of traffickers’ assets within the United States.  A bank 
account freeze order would validly regulate U.S. citizenry to 
prevent them from aiding in any way the activities of those who 
support the sanctions target, including support by means of the 
return of assets invested in the United States and subject to U.S. 
citizens’ control.  These measures might prove politically 
controversial but would not exceed the jurisdictional authority of 
the United States to regulate the conduct of its citizenry in U.S. 
territory. 
 
activity, because private companies can similarly use sales contracts to acquire 
goods”). 
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The Iran Sanctions Act fares better than the Helms Burton Act 
as a reasonable exercise of terrinational jurisdiction.  Most of its 
sanctions options involve restrictions on the business activity of 
U.S. nationals (e.g., prohibiting U.S. banks from loaning more than 
$10 million per year to a foreign sanctioned person or barring U.S. 
companies from receiving export licenses for goods to be shipped 
to foreign sanctioned persons).  Alternatively, the Act regulates 
U.S. government actors but only in their capacity as private market 
participants (e.g., federal government procurement debarment 
against foreign sanctioned persons or denial of Export-Import 
Bank assistance in connection with products to be exported from 
the United States to a foreign sanctioned person or procurement).  
The most jurisdictionally questionable provision of the Iran 
Sanctions Act is its bar on the import of goods into the United 
States from foreign sanctioned persons, as this involves the 
restriction of governmental actors with respect to inherently 
governmental functions of import control. 
More problematic still are recent proposals to broaden U.S. 
sanctions measures by means of holding a parent U.S. company 
strictly liable for extraterritorial acts of its foreign-incorporated 
subsidiary as if the U.S. parent company had engaged in those acts 
itself.175  This approach exceeds the bounds of terrinational 
jurisdiction as it conditions liability exclusively on acts occurring 
abroad and without the participation of the parent company.  By 
contrast, another proposal to bar U.S. parent companies from 
taking steps to set up a foreign subsidiary for the purpose of 
circumventing sanctions against Iran permissibly regulates 
conduct occurring within the United States by U.S. companies.176 
To be sure, terrinational secondary sanctions may be less 
comprehensive than other forms of secondary sanctions because 
they abjure control of the conduct of foreign actors or even the 
 
175 See Clif Burns, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: It’s What’s for Dinner, EXPORT 
LAW BLOG, June 27, 2008, http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/date 
/2008/06 (describing how the provisions of “Stop Business with Terrorists Act of 
2008” bills introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives would hold 
U.S. parent corporations liable for business dealings of foreign subsidiaries with 
Iran, specifically for any acts outside the United States of foreign subsidiaries that, 
if committed inside the United States or by a U.S. person, would constitute a 
violation of existing sanctions against Iran). 
176 See Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 
2008, S. 3445, 110th Cong. § 104 (2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us 
/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-3445: (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (describing the 
liability of parent companies for violations of sanctions by foreign subsidiaries). 
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conduct of U.S. actors when they are abroad.  But other more 
legally contentious forms of secondary sanctions are themselves far 
from comprehensive.  For example, when secondary sanctions are 
extended to the conduct of foreign incorporated subsidiaries of 
U.S. parent companies, this leaves unregulated the vast range of 
foreign companies that are not owned or controlled by a U.S. 
parent.  Of course, there is a risk with terrinational sanctions that 
U.S. citizens and companies will seek to avoid their application by 
incorporating or doing business abroad.  But this possibility of 
evasion is already present for any sanctions measures, not just 
terrinationally limited secondary sanctions that stop short of 
seeking to regulate all forms of extraterritorial conduct.  Moreover, 
as the law already does in the case of primary sanctions, it may 
prohibit U.S. citizens while in U.S. territory from engaging in 
corporate shell games or other activity for the purpose of evading 
or avoiding existing sanctions measures.177 
5. CONCLUSION 
Secondary sanctions have a limited but continuing role to play 
in circumstances where unilateral primary sanctions alone are 
ineffective and consensus on multilateral sanctions is not possible.  
Their use to date, however, has been clouded by confusion about 
their legality and, in particular, because of a misconception that 
any purpose or intent to affect conduct abroad taints them with the 
brand of extraterritorial illegality.  The relevant inquiry for 
adjudging the legality of secondary sanctions measures should be 
whom they regulate and where the conduct subject to regulation 
takes place.  When secondary sanctions are terrinationally 
restricted to the regulation of U.S. nationals with respect to their 
non-governmental acts within the United States, then these 
sanctions should be viewed as presumptively permissible as a 
matter of customary jurisdictional law.  As the United States 
considers secondary sanctions measures in the future, it should 
consider terrinationally tailored sanctions as an alternative to other 
more legally vulnerable measures. 
 
 
177 See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 541.204 (2006) (Zimbabwe sanctions regulations 
providing in part that “[a]ny transaction by a U.S. person or within the United 
States on or after the effective date that evades or avoids, has the purpose of 
evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this 
part is prohibited”). 
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